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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's 2009 term presented an
unprecedented number of cases-twelve argued cases and five per
curiam decisions-raising issues related to the role of attorneys and
the practice of law.' This body of cases represents a substantial
departure from dockets in recent history, where typically the Court
took up less than a handful of lawyering cases each term. While some
might consider the increased number of cases addressing the law of
lawyering a mere coincidence, this Article contends that it is
something more. The Court's devotion of so much time to these
1. In a typical term the Supreme Court hears a handful of such cases at most.
See infra Appendix, and notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
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matters is noteworthy not only for the individual issues resolved, but
also for the cases' existence-indeed dominance-on the docket.
This Article offers the first comprehensive overview of the 2009 cases
and their outcomes.
Broadly speaking, the cases fall into two categories. The first group
of cases focuses on access to lawyers and legal advice. The second
group examines harms caused by lawyers. The issues regarding
access to legal advice include:
" the First Amendment rights of attorneys to give advice and to
advertise;
* the calculation of attorneys' fees awarded under fee-shifting
statutes3 as well as whether an attorney holds a property right in
such an award;4 and
" the right to an immediate appeal of a challenged attorney-client
privilege waiver.
The concerns surrounding bad lawyering include:
" the extent to which a prosecutor may face civil liability for
procuring false testimony and introducing it at trial;6 and
" the standards for finding ineffective assistance of counsel when
7
a criminal defense attorney lacks the requisite experience,
offers insufficient mitigation evidence," delivers a poor closing
argument,9 gives faulty advice,m misses a critical filing deadline,11
or fails to request a limiting instruction. 12
2. Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2009), affd
in part and rev'd in part, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712
(2010); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 541 F.3d 785, 792, 794 (8th
Cir. 2008), affd in part and rev'd in part, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1341 (2010).
3. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 336 F. Appx. 332, 333 (4th Cir.
2009) (per curiam), rev'd and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 2149, 2156 (2010); Kenny A. ex rel.
Winn v. Perdue, 532 F.3d 1209, 1214, 1230-31 (1lth Cir. 2008), rev'd and remanded,
130 S. Ct. 1662, 1669 (2010).
4. Ratliffv. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800, 801 (8th Cir. 2008), rev'd and remanded, 130 S.
Ct. 2521, 2524 (2010).
5. Carpenter v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 541 F.3d 1048, 1052 (lth Cir. 2008) (per
curiam), affd, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 609 (2009).
6. McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, Iowa, 547 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 2008),
appeal dismissed, Pottawattamie County v. McGhee, 130 S. Ct. 1047 (2010).
7. Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281, 1289, 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2008), affid, 130 S.
Ct. 841, 845 (2010).
8. Van Hook v. Anderson, 560 F.3d 523, 525 (6th Cir. 2009), rev'd and remanded,
Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 20 (2009) (per curiam); Belmontes v. Ayers, 529
F.3d 834, 848 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd and remanded, Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383,
391 (2009) (per curiam); Porter v. Attorney Gen., 552 F.3d 1260, 1269 (11th Cir.
2008), rev'd, Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 448 (2009) (per curiam);Jefferson v.
Hall, 570 F.3d 1283 (111 Cir. 2009), vacated and remanded, Jefferson v. Upton, 130 S.
Ct. 2217, 2223 (2010) (per curiam); Sears v. State, 514 S.E.2d 429 (Ga. 1999), vacated
and remanded, Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259, 3261(2010) (per curiam).
9. Spisak v. Mitchell, 465 F.3d 684, 704 (6th Cir. 2006), rev'd, Smith v. Spisak,
130 S. Ct. 676, 680 (2010).
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Each case addressed critical issues, many of which cut to the core of
an attorney's ability to practice competently and in compliance with
the profession's ethical obligations. Perhaps even more important
than the facts and holdings of the individual cases, however, is the
message conveyed by the cases' collective presence on the Court's
docket. The Court's devotion of fifteen percent9 of its limited time
during the 2009 term to cases raising questions about the role of
lawyers and the practice of law is remarkable. The law governing
lawyers is a sometimes ignored, but vitally important body of law,
essential to the proper function of our justice system and our
democratic form of government. The outcomes of these cases impact
the obligations of attorneys in meaningful ways and, when considered
together, signal how the Court may be giving concerns about the law
of lawyering a higher priority.
This Article proceeds in two parts. Part I opens with a discussion to
define what constitutes "the law of lawyering" for purposes here and
to provide a brief history of the Court's attention to this area of law
over the past decade. Part I then examines the cases from the 2009
term individually, setting forth a summary of the ways in which each
presents questions related to the law of lawyering. Part II turns to a
collective reading of the 2009 cases, reflecting on the Court's
heightened interest in lawyering issues, and suggesting insights that
might be drawn by viewing these cases as part of a larger picture. In
particular, this Part identifies intersections among the cases as a
means for gaining further understanding about how their outcomes
may shape the legal profession. To be sure, the influence of these
cases on professional responsibility jurisprudence will become more
apparent over time. Nevertheless, a careful study of the opinions, as
well as the briefs and oral arguments in the cases, reveals three
10. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482,484 (Ky. 2008), revd and remanded,
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1487 (2010).
11. Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1336 (lth Cir. 2008) (per curiam) rev'd
and remanded, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2554 (2010).
12. Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572, 573 (6th Cir. 2008), rev'd and remanded,
130 S.Ct. 2250, 2253 (2010).
13. During the 2009 Term, the Court issued eighty-six merits opinions, sixteen
(18.6%) of which included issues related to lawyering. See supra notes 2-2 (listing the
cases related to lawyering); see also Supreme Court of the United States Granted
and Noted List October Term 2009, http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/
09grantednotedlist.aspx (last visited June 24, 2010) (providing a comprehensive list
of cases heard by the Supreme Court in the October 2009 term); SCOTUSblog Final
Stats OT09, Summary of the Supreme Court's Workload, October Term 2009,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Final-Stats-OT09-
0707101.pdf (last visited July 22, 2010). One lawyering case discussed in the article,
Pottawattamie County v. McGhee, is not included in this count because the Court did
not issue a merits opinion in the case. See discussion infra notes 205 to 233.
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preliminary observations. First, when taken as a whole, the cases
evidence troubling limitations on access to legal advice coupled with
an inability to fully redress harms caused by bad lawyering. Second,
the cases offer helpful lessons for those involved in future regulation
of the legal profession. Third, the cases illustrate the importance of
constitutional considerations to the field of lawyer ethics. An
awareness of these observations will assist scholars and practitioners
in appreciating the Court's increased attention to the law of
lawyering during the 2009 term.
I. MERE COINCIDENCE? A SUMMARY OF THE CASES
At the outset, it is important to understand what is meant by the
law of lawyering, and how the cases discussed in this Article have
been collected. The term "law of lawyering" (or lawyer ethics, legal
ethics, professional responsibility, law governing lawyers-all other
ways to describe a similar body of law14) encompasses the legal
regulations and ethical obligations governing lawyers. These
regulations and obligations can be found in sources like the
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct and
the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers but, as Ted Schneyer observes, "the law of lawyering"
consists of "strands of law whose only commonality is their bearing on
the work of a diverse profession" which can make the term difficult to
define.15  Furthermore, James Moliterno explains that "[b]ecause
defining much of the law of lawyering depends on the norms of
practice, so too the law of lawyering varies according to the practice
setting in which the affected lawyer's work exists."16 As used in this
14. Though these terms often are used interchangeably, they also can be
understood to hold specific meanings. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD 4 (2d ed. 1998) ("What is the
'ethics' in legal ethics? That in itself is a matter of ethical debate. In a narrow sense,
the term refers to the law of lawyering-the formal rules governing attorneys'
conduct. In a broader sense, legal ethics involves application of ethical theory and
implicates deeper questions about the moral dimensions of our professional lives.").
For further discussion on the various terms used to describe this area of law, see
posting of John Steele to Legal Ethics Forum and related comments,
http://www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2010/06/-least-analytically-rigorous-and-
hence-most-subjective-of-lawschool-subjects-legal-ethics.html (June 14, 2010, 18:24
EST).
15. Ted Schneyer, The ALI's Restatement and the ABA 's Model Rules: Rivals or
Compliments?, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 25, 25 (1993) (explaining that the law of lawyering
"has only lately been conceived as a distinct legal field" and consists of "constitutional
doctrine, statutory law, and of course the American Bar Association's legal ethics
codes as adopted by state supreme courts") (citation omitted).
16. James E. Moliterno, Practice Setting as an Organizing Theme for a Law and Ethics of
Lawyering Curriculum, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393, 394 (1998); see also DEBORAH
RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 1 (4th Ed. 2004) (observing that "the law of
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Article, a "lawyering" issue is understood to be a topic covered by
leading casebooks in the field and related to the role of an attorney
and the practice of law.'7 These topics include the duty to render
candid advice, lawyer advertising, attorneys' fees, attorney-client
privilege, prosecutorial ethics, and ineffective assistance of counsel.'"
lawyering-the codes of conduct and the other bodies of law governing legal
practice-structures but by no means limits" the universe of "legal ethics").
17. In collecting cases from the 2009 term and also the preceding decade, the
general contents of three leading casebooks were used as a guide: Rhode & Luban,
supra note 16 (covering the concept of a profession, the American legal profession,
professional independence and professional codes, the advocate's role in an
adversary system, confidentiality and attorney-client privilege, criminal defense,
prosecutorial ethics, ethics in organizational settings, negotiation and mediation, the
lawyer's counseling role, conflicts of interest, lawyer-client decision making, market
regulation, the distribution of legal services, admission to the bar, discipline and
malpractice, and legal education); STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS, (8th
ed. 2009) (covering the attorney-client relationship, conflicts of interest, special
lawyer roles, avoiding and redressing professional failure, and first amendment rights
of lawyers and judicial candidates); and LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAw (2d ed. 2008) (covering the regulation of lawyers,
lawyer liability, client confidences, attorney-client privilege, relationships between
lawyers and clients, conflicts of interest, lawyers' duties to courts, lawyers' duties to
adversaries and third parties, regulatory restrictions on law practice, and the
provision of legal services).
18.The regulation of judicial conduct is also often encompassed under the law of
lawyering umbrella, but for purposes of this Article and the Appendix of cases
involving a lawyering issue that follows, cases involving regulation of the judiciary or
judicial misconduct have been excluded. See, e.g., Sao Paolo v. American Tobacco
Co., 535 U.S. 229 (2002) (per curiam) (judicial recusal); Republican Party of Minn.
v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (judicial election campaigns); and Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (judicial recusal). Likewise some law of
lawyering casebooks address lawyers' use of peremptory challenges, and those cases
have been excluded from this survey as well. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 545 U.S.
162 (2005); Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S.
231 (2005). It also should be noted that certain aspects of civil procedure may
appear in the casebooks, but for purposes here such cases were included only if they
also directly addressed the professional or ethical obligations of the attorney
involved. For example, Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter is a case involving civil
procedure that was included because it also involved protection of attorney-client
privilege (see discussion infra notes 171 to 204 and accompanying text), but Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (announcing new "plausibility"
standard for complaint to survive a motion to dismiss) was not included. A similar
selection process was used for ineffective assistance of counsel cases as well, thus
excluding cases like Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453 (2000) (holding "that an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim asserted as cause for the procedural default of
another claim can itself be procedurally defaulted"); Glover v. United States, 331 U.S.
198, 204 (2001) (finding prejudice in sentencing error but "express[ing] no opinion
on the ultimate merits of Glover's claim because the question of deficient
performance is not before us"); Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 509 (2003)
("hold[ing] that failure to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct
appeal does not bar the claim from being brought in a later, appropriate
proceeding"); Arave v. Hoffman, 552 U.S. 117, 188 (per curiam) (2008) (granting
[Vol. 59:14991504
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That some of these cases overlap into other areas of law, such as
criminal law, civil procedure, or bankruptcy, does not mean that they
are not also law of lawyering cases. Indeed, in many ways the law of
lawyering permeates all areas of the law.19
It also is important to understand the methodology employed in
this Article for analyzing the Court's treatment of the law of
lawyering.' This Article is not intended to offer a comprehensive
empirical analysis, and leaves that endeavor for another day. Rather,
the Article looks back at the past decade in an effort to assess whether
the Court's selection of seventeen cases involving lawyering issues
during the 2009 term was, in fact, unusual. In order to provide a
meaningful comparison with the previous terms, all merits opinions
issued by the Court since the 1999 term were reviewed. Opinions
touching on an issue related to the law of lawyering, as defined above,
were included in the count for each term, with the exception of
several categories such as cases dismissed as improvidently granted
motion to vacate and dismissing ineffective assistance of counsel case as moot); and
Magwood v. Patterson, 130 S. Ct. 2788, 2803 (2010) (holding "that Magwood's first
application challenging his new sentence . . . is not 'second or successive"' and
declining to "address Magwood's contention that the Court of Appeals erred in
rejecting his ineffective-assistance claim"). Last, some cases are close calls and open
for debate as to whether a "lawyering" issue is raised. For example, during the 2005
term the Court decided Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006), holding that the
whistle-blowing activity of a government employee, who happened to be a district
attorney, was not protected under the First Amendment. This case is not included in
the Appendix because the Court's focus was on Ceballos's speech as a government
employee, not a lawyer. Similarly, in 2007 the Court decided Richlin Security Service
Co. v. Chertoff 553 U.S. 571 (2007), a case involving paralegal fees that is excluded
here. In some instances one might argue for the exclusion or inclusion of a
particular case that did or did not make the list contained in the Appendix. Even so,
adding or omitting one or two cases for a particular term does not impact the
ultimate conclusion that the 2009 docket presented an unusually large number of
cases involving lawyering issues.
19. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIY: ETHICS BY THE
PERVASIVE METHOD 4 (2d ed. 1998) ("Legal ethics deserves discussion in all
substantive areas [of the law] because it arises in all substantive areas."). For further
discussion of the structure and history of lawyer regulation, see id. at 40-50.
20. This survey expands on the analysis of Supreme Court cases contained in
the author's online essay previewing the 2009 term, Renee Newman Knake,
Prioritizing Professional Responsibility and the Legal Profession: A Preview of the United States
Supreme Court's 2009-2010 Term, 5 DUKEJ. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y SIDEBAR 1 (2009),
portions of which are incorporated in this Article. The initial analysis relied on the
classification of cases by sources such as the Findlaw Supreme Court Case Index and
database searches in Lexis and Westlaw using several queries. For the list that
appears in the Appendix, all merits opinions were reviewed for lawyering issues as
described supra notes 14-19; infra 21-22 and accompanying text. The list contained
in theAppendix resulted in a slight increase (no more than three) in the number of
lawyering opinions for two of the terms.
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and cases involving judges.1 While the survey of cases conducted
here is not intended to be a complete quantitative examination of the
Court's attention to the law of lawyering, the survey does provide a
sufficient background to appreciate just how unusual it is for
seventeen cases involving lawyering issues to find their way to the
Court during a single term. Moreover, though this Article examines
only the previous decade, others suggest that earlier terms have been
even more sparse in their inclusion of cases involving lawyering
issues."
During the ten years before the 2009 term, the Supreme Court
heard no more than a handful of cases addressing issues related to
the role of an attorney and the practice of law in any term. 2' The
lawyering cases on the Court's docket in 2009 were at least triple the
number on previous dockets over the past decade. Thus one might
conclude, simply based on this sizeable increase in quantity alone,
that the Court's attention to lawyering issues must be more than
mere coincidence. Yet the cases heard in the 2009 term are
remarkable for more than just their quantity; their substance also
must be considered. For example, the Court decided significantly
more cases touching on lawyering issues in ineffective assistance of
counsel cases than in previous terms (ten in 2009 compared to
approximately two or three at most in previous years).4 The Court
also took up a number of cases addressing access to lawyers and legal
advice, as discussed more fully in Part I.A. of this Article. Of further
note is the dominance of cases involving constitutional issues.' 5
Two questions necessarily follow. First, why this sudden spike in
cases related to the legal profession? Second, what lessons or
conclusions might be drawn from the particular issues raised and the
outcomes of the cases? As to the first question, perhaps the upsurge
is simply a reflection of an increased number of petitions presenting
questions related to law practice, 26 or the fact that the most recently
21. For further explanation about the collection of cases included in this survey
and listed in the Appendix, see supra notes 17-20.
22. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 n.15
(1983) (noting that over the course of twenty-five years the Supreme Court granted
review of state court decisions on attorney bar-related matters on only eight
occasions); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality II: Is Confidentiality
Constitutional?, 75 IOWA L. Rv. 601, 627 (1990) (estimating that from 1975-1990 the
Supreme Court considered the professional conduct of lawyers in only ten cases).
23. See Appendix listing cases. See also notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
24. See Appendix listing cases by term and identifying lawyering issues.
25. See discussion infra Part II.C.
26. Although beyond the scope of this Article, a historical review or survey of
petitions for certiorari addressing issues related to the legal profession and their
dispositions would be an interesting area for future research and might lend further
1506 [Vol. 59:1499
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appointed Justices have more law practice experience than their
predecessors.27 Or it may be that the larger movement toward
increased scrutiny of attorney regulation, particularly in the wake of
recent corporate and government29 scandals involving lawyers, has
led to a greater sensitivity to these issues. Regardless of the cause, the
Court's heightened interest at a minimum is reflected in, if not
influenced by, the popular momentum for attorney regulation
reforms. Inclusion of so many cases involving lawyering issues on the
2009 docket demonstrates the Supreme Court's prioritization of
concerns about the role of attorneys and the practice of law.
As for the second question, the remainder of this Article is devoted
to identifying themes and reflecting on lessons that might be drawn
insight into the significance of the Court's lawyering focus during the 2009 term.
27. See, e.g., Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as
an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1117
n.66 (2005) ("All nine of the Justices of the late Rehnquist Court were graduates of
elite schools with either little practice experience or practice experience largely
limited to constitutional litigation or defense-side civil litigation."). To compare, the
most recent appointees to the Court all have significant experience engaging in the
practice of law. See Angie Drobnic Holan, Sotomayor's Experience Does Not Significantly
Outstrip Other Justices, POLITIFACT, May 26, 2009, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/statements/2009/may/26/barack-obama/sotomayors-experience-does-not-
significantly-outst/ (listing law practice experience of Supreme Court justices).
28. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Citizen Lauyer-A Brief Informal History of a
Myth with Some Basis in Reality, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1169, 1205 (2009) (observing
that "in the wake of several major scandals, such as the savings-and-loan crisis and the
Enron collapse, . . . lawyers . . .were found to have actively enabled frauds that
resulted in huge losses"); Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties
within Twenty-First-Century New Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 1245, 1265 (2009)
(observing that "[a]fter the early twenty-first-century financial scandals, many
pointed a blaming finger to the attorneys who had worked for the fallen
corporations, arguing that the '[1]awyers' negligence almost certainly contributed to
the wave of corporate scandals that shook the securities markets in 2001 and 2002'"
and referencing new regulatory efforts) (quoting Developments in the Law-
Corporations and Society, 117 HARv. L. REV. 2169, 2227 (2004)).
29. See, e.g., Judge Marcia S. Krieger, A Twenty-First Century Ethos for the Legal
Profession: Why Bother?, 86 DENY. U. L. REv. 865, 878-79 (2009) (considering modern
ethics regulation and stating that "distrust of lawyers ... is not at all surprising given
the steady drumbeat of scandals involving business people, government figures,
lawyers and judges. One only need reflect on recent scandals that embroiled
prominent leaders (many of whom were lawyers): President Bill Clinton, U.S.
Congressmen Randy Cunningham and Robert Ney, Illinois Governor Rod
Blagojevich, Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez, Alaska Senator Ted Stevens and the
justice department attorneys that prosecuted him, as well as a variety of federal and
state judges"). For further discussion of attorney involvement in corporate and
government scandals, see W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1167, 1175 (2005) (discussing the involvement of lawyers in cases where
legal advice facilitated or permitted client wrong-doing, and suggesting as a possible
cause the fact that the lawyers "expected some degree of secrecy, either through the
audit lottery (in the case of tax shelters), the cover provided by byzantine
transactions and obfuscated disclosures (the Enron manipulations), or geographic
isolation and covert activities (the interrogations at Guantanamo Bay and Abu
Ghraib)").
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from the Court's attention to lawyering issues. Before turning to
these observations, however, the individual cases deserve attention.
Two broad themes can be drawn from the cases taken up by the
Supreme Court during the 2009 term: access to lawyers and harm
caused by lawyers. The cases are summarized below.
A. Cases Addressing Access to Lawyers
1. Access to legal advice
One of the more important aspects of access to legal advice facing
the Court during the 2009 term was the degree of First Amendment
protection warranted (if any) when Congress limits lawful legal
advice. An attorney's ability to deliver complete and competent
advice, and a client's right to receive such advice, goes to the very
heart of access to the law. Traditionally, governance of attorney
advice has been left to the highest court in each state, and
professional conduct rules provide direction for attorneys regarding
their duties and obligations to render guidance to clients. For
example, the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules) require that an attorney
"provide competent representation, 31  "exercise independent
professional judgment, 32 "explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation, ' and "render candid advice." 4 Two cases from
the 2009 term involved federal statutes encroaching on a lawyer's
ability to advise her client.
33
a. Competent advice, compelled advertising, and the first amendment:
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States
In Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States3 6 the Court was
asked to define the First Amendment protection that attorney advice
and advertising deserves in a challenge to the Bankruptcy Abuse
30. It should be noted that while several of the cases discussed in this Article
present additional important questions not related directly to the law of lawyering,
the focus here is limited to concerns bearing on the practice of law or the
relationship between attorneys and clients.
31. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUGT R. 1.1 (2009).
32. Id.atR.2.1.
33. Id. at R. 1.4(b).
34. Id. at R. 2.1.
35. See infra notes 37, 65-70 and accompanying text (citing and explaining the
statutes passed by Congress and the specific challenges to them).
36. 541 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2008), affd in part and rev'd in part, 130 S. Ct. 1324
(2010).
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Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).37 This
case raised two previously unaddressed issues in First Amendment
jurisprudence: the level of constitutional protection afforded to
attorney advice and, correspondingly, the level of constitutional
protection afforded to the client's right to receive that advice. 38 The
plaintiffs also questioned the constitutionality of the BAPCPA's
provisions that impose various disclosure requirements on attorneys'
advertisement of bankruptcy services.39
To understand the issues involved in this appeal, some explanation
of the BAPCPA is necessary. Congress enacted the BAPCPA after
considering eight years of testimony and reports on increasingly
prevalent fraud within the bankruptcy system.40 The legislation was
intended to target both debtors and attorneys who were perceived as
abusing the bankruptcy laws.41 Among numerous amendments and
additions to the federal Bankruptcy Code, the BAPCPA includes
regulations applicable not only to debtors, but also to debt relief
agencies, a term that has been construed by the majority of courts
(and, ultimately, the Supreme Court in Milavetz) to include
attorneys. 42 These regulations include a prohibition on certain advice
37. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
38. See Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 788 n.1 (observing that the Milavetz "client-plaintiffs
are appearing on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated who desire to
exercise their First Amendment rights with attorneys regarding bankruptcy
information"); see also Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws,
Illegal Courses of Conduct, "Situation-Altering Utterances," and the Uncharted Zones,
90 CORNELL L. REv. 1277, 1284 (2005) (noting that the Supreme Court "has never
squarely confronted" the First Amendment status of certain categories of speech,
such as "professional advice to clients").
39. Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 794.
40. For more detail on the BAPCPA's origins, see Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and
Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 605,
688-89 (2008) (noting that BAPCPA's enactment was extremely controversial
because it was a result of lobbying by some of the nation's leading consumer credit
providers). Those lobbying the bill allegedly invested more than $40 million in their
efforts. Id. at 689.
41. According to the legislative record, a primary purpose of the BAPCPA is to
address "misconduct by attorneys and other professionals" and "abusive practices by
consumer debtors who, for example, knowingly load up with credit card purchases or
recklessly obtain cash advances and then file for bankruptcy relief." H.R. REP. No.
109-31, at 5, 15 (2005) (internal quotation omitted), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N.
88, 92, 101.
42. The BAPCPA defines the term "debt relief agency" as "any person who
provides any bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person in return for the payment of
money or other valuable consideration." 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A) (2006). At least six
courts in addition to the Eighth Circuit in Milavetz have so held. See, e.g., Hersh v.
United States ex rel. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that
attorneys are included in the term "debt relief agency") cert. denied, No. 08-1174, 2010
WL 1005956, at *1 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2010); see also Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 790 (citing five
federal district court cases holding that attorneys are debt relief agencies and two
holding the opposite) (citations omitted).
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offered by an attorney to a debtor-client regarding the accumulation
of additional debt in contemplation of bankruptcy 43 and a disclosure
that must be included in certain advertising by an attorney who offers
bankruptcy-related advice stating as follows: "We are a debt relief
agency. We help people file for bankruptcy relief under the
Bankruptcy Code. 44
The BAPCPA establishes penalties for the violation of these
provisions. The penalties include voidance of any contract failing to
comply with the Act's provisions, attorney liability to the debtor for
actual damages and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, and
enforcement by the state attorney general or similar official for
injunctive relief or monetary damages.45 Shortly after the enactment
of the BAPCPA, the Milavetz plaintiffs-two attorneys, their law firm,
and two clients-filed a lawsuit against the federal government
challenging the application of the debt relief agency classification to
attorneys, as well as the advice prohibition and the mandatory
advertising disclosures.
Regarding the advice prohibition, the parties recognized that the
level of First Amendment protection afforded to attorney advice is
unclear. The plaintiffs argued for strict scrutiny because the
BAPCPA's prohibition on bankruptcy-related advice is content-
based.4c' The government disagreed, suggesting instead that the court
apply a more lenient standard applicable to attorney ethics
regulations.47 A divided Eighth Circuit panel avoided the question of
the applicable standard of review. Instead the court found that
43. The BAPCPA provides in pertinent part that "[a] debt relief agency shall not
... advise an assisted person or prospective assisted person to incur more debt in
contemplation of such person filing [for bankruptcy]." 11 U.S.C. § 526 (a) (4)
(2006).
44. Id. at §§ 528(a)(4),(b)(2)(B). The BAPCPA requires the disclosure (or
something substantially similar) in any advertisement for "bankruptcy assistance
services" or referencing "the benefits of bankruptcy" or any advertisement regarding
"assistance with respect to credit defaults, mortgage foreclosures, eviction
proceedings, excessive debt, debt collection pressure, or inability to pay any
consumer debt." Id. at §§ 528(a) (3), (b) (2) (B).
45. See id. at §§ 526(c) (1)-(3), (5) (explaining how the penalties are triggered).
46. See Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 792 (citing Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 642 (1994)). Strict scrutiny requires the government to demonstrate a
compelling interest in regulating the speech at issue and to employ the least
restrictive means possible. Id.
47. See id. at 793 (citing Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991)). The
standard established in the Gentile case "balance[s] the First Amendment rights of
the attorneys against the government's legitimate interest in regulating the activity in
question-the prohibition of advising assisted persons to incur more debt in
contemplation of bankruptcy--and then determine[s] whether the regulations
impose 'only narrow and necessary limitations on lawyers' speech.'" Id. (quoting
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075).
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under any standard the provision was "unconstitutionally
overbroad"8 in that it not only prohibited unlawful advice (as the
government suggested)49 but also "advice constituting prudent
prebankruptcy planning that is not an attempt to circumvent, abuse,
or undermine the bankruptcy laws." 0 Furthermore, the court found
that the advice prohibition "prevents attorneys from fulfilling their
duty to clients to give them appropriate and beneficial advice."'" The
debtor-client's right to receive such advice was not addressed
explicitly in the court's determination.
As for the mandatory advertising disclosures, the Milavetz plaintiffs
claimed that the disclosures violated the First Amendment rights of
attorneys by compelling speech. 2 They also argued that the general
public is likely to be confused by an advertisement for a "debt relief
agency" that does not distinguish attorneys from non-attorneys, and
that the disclosure requirement is overbroad, if not inaccurate,
because the disclosure is mandated for any attorney who might give
bankruptcy advice, even on an occasional or incidental basis, and for
all advertising regardless of whether it mentions bankruptcy or is
deceptive . The government, for its part, "contend[ed] that
Congress enacted [the] disclosure requirements to address problems
with deceitful or unclear advertising by bankruptcy attorneys. 54
Although restrictions on non-deceptive advertising are typically
reviewed under intermediate scrutiny (the level that the district court
applied in finding the disclosures unconstitutional), the Eighth
Circuit followed the government's position and applied the test used
by the Supreme Court in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the
48. Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 793.
49. The court observed:
According to the government, [this section] should be interpreted as merely
preventing an attorney from advising [a debtor-client] to take on more debt
in contemplation of bankruptcy when the incurrence of such debt is done
with the intent to manipulate the bankruptcy system, engage in abusive
conduct, or take unfair advantage of the bankruptcy discharge.
Id.
50. Id. As examples of such prudent (and lawful) planning, the court listed
mortgage refinancing to "free up additional funds to pay off other debts," and the
purchase of "a reliable automobile before filing for bankruptcy, so that the debtor
will have dependable transportation to travel to and from work." Id. at 794.
51. Id. at 793.
52. See id. at 794-95 (showing that the First Amendment encompasses both the
right to speak freely as well as the right to refrain from speaking).
53. See id. at 796-97 (dismissing the attorneys' concerns that the required
disclosures would confuse the general public because nothing in the Code prohibits
attorneys from affirmatively identifying themselves as attorneys in addition to
identifying themselves as a debt relief agency).
54. Id. at 795.
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Supreme Court of Ohio,5 5 employing a rational basis review to uphold
the disclosure requirements because they were intended to avoid
potentially deceptive advertising. 56  Both sides petitioned the
Supreme Court for review and the appeals were consolidated. 7
The Supreme Court upheld the Eighth Circuit's determination
that lawyers are debt relief agencies and that the advertising
disclosure requirements are constitutional, but reversed the finding
of overbreadth on the advice ban.58 Justice Sotomayor, writing the
unanimous opinion, explained:
After reviewing these competing claims, we are persuaded that a
narrower reading... is sounder, although we do not adopt
precisely the view the Government advocates. The Government's
sources show that the phrase "in contemplation of' bankruptcy has
so commonly been associated with abusive conduct that it may
readily be understood to prefigure abuse. . . . [W]e think the
phrase refers to a specific type of misconduct designed to
manipulate the protections of the bankruptcy system ... [and]
conclude that [it] prohibits a debt relief agency [or attorney] only
from advising a debtor to incur more debt because the debtor is
filing for bankruptcy, rather than for a valid purpose.59
The Court explicitly declined, however, to "consider whether the
statute so construed withstands First Amendment scrutiny,"' leaving
open the question of whether the advice given by an attorney
warrants constitutional free speech protections.6 Justice Sotomayor
went on to observe that "it is hard to see how a rule that narrowly
prohibits an attorney from affirmatively advising a client to commit
this type of abusive prefiling conduct could chill attorney speech or
inhibit the attorney-client relationship."62 Nevertheless, the result of
Milavetz endorses a ban on legal advice, leaving at least some lawyers
to reach a different conclusion. They speculate that this result will
55. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
56. See Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 796 (concluding that a lower level of review was
appropriate because the disclosure requirements were only intended to prevent
potentially deceptive advertising and not legitimate and constitutionally protected
advertising).
57. See United States v. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., 129 S. Ct. 2769 (2009)
(noting that the case is consolidated).
58. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1341
(2010).
59. Id. at 1335-36 (2010).
60. Id. at 1339.
61. The Court declined to reach the First Amendment issue because the Court
read the statute narrowly, and as such the issue had not been properly raised by the
parties below. Id.
62. Id. at 1338.
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have a chilling effect on attorney advice and will inhibit the attorney-
client relationship.63
b. Attorney advice as expert advice and amicus advocacy: Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project
A second federal ban on the guidance that attorneys may give to
their clients was challenged in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.64
While this case touched on a range of concerns well beyond the law
of lawyering, certain provisions of the federal law at issue may be read
to constrain the advice lawyers give to clients. The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act 65 and its amendment, the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 66 criminalize "expert advice or
assistance given to any group designated as "a foreign terrorist
organization ' 6" even if such support is for lawful, nonviolent activities
or humanitarian efforts. 69 "Expert advice or assistance" is defined as
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge," which includes
legal advice."6
This prohibition was attacked by the Humanitarian Law Project
and a retired administrative law judge, among others, who sought to
provide support to the Kurdistan Workers Party and the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam for nonviolent and lawful peace-making
activities.7 ' This proffered support included "offer[ing] their legal
expertise in negotiating peace agreements. 72  The Ninth Circuit
pointed out that, "[a] t oral argument, the government stated that
filing an amicus brief in support of a foreign terrorist organization
would violate [the] prohibition against providing 'expert advice or
assistance.' 7 3 Accordingly, the court held that the "other specialized
63. See, e.g., infra notes 384-85 and accompanying text.
64. 552 F.3d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010). This
case was subsequently consolidated with Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, 130 S. Ct.
49 (2009).
65. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
66. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C).
67. Id. at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (3) (2006).
68. ADEPA, 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2006).
69. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project, 552 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2009)
(challenging ADEPA and its IRTPA amendment because it barred plaintiffs from
providing material support to organizations AEDPA designated as foreign terrorist
organizations, even though the support was for "nonviolent and lawful activities" of
the organization).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (3).
71. Humanitarian Law Project, 552 F.3d at 921.
72. Id. at 921 n.1.
73. Id. at 930. On brief to the Supreme Court, however, amici in support of the
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knowledge" portion of the prohibition on "expert advice or
assistance" language was void for vagueness as applied because it
"cover[ed] constitutionally protected advocacy."74 The Ninth Circuit
justified its position by reasoning that the "requirement for clarity is
enhanced when criminal sanctions are at issue or when the statute
abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms. 75
On petition to the Supreme Court, Attorney General Holder made
the case that the provisions are not vague and, "in any event...
regulate[] conduct, not speech, and do[] not violate the First
Amendment."76 In opposition, the Humanitarian Law Project argued
that the speech at issue is "pure political speech"-namely "to lobby
Congress, to teach and advise on human rights, to promote peaceful
resolution of political disputes, and to advocate for the human rights
of minority populations"-deserving of "the First Amendment's
highest protection., 77  Further, they countered that the "'expert
advice' provisions criminalize speech on the basis of its content," and
maintained that the Ninth Circuit's determination should be
affirmed.78
The Supreme Court, however, rejected "the extreme positions" 79
advanced by both sides. In Chief Justice Roberts's words, writing for
the 6-3 majority, "[t] he First Amendment issue before [the Court] is
more refined than either plaintiffs or the Government would have
it."8°  The majority rejected outright the Government's conduct
government suggested otherwise. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Scholars, Attorneys, and
Former Public Officials with Experience in Terrorism-Related Issues In Support of
Petitioners at 26 n.9, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, Nos. 08-1498, 09-89 (U.S.
Dec. 23, 2009) ("The government was incorrect in arguing below that submitting an
amicus brief on a [foreign terrorist organization's] behalf would be prohibited [as]
'expert advice or assistance' under the statute."). They further argued that "the
statute's content-neutral licensing provision [under 31 C.F.R. § 597.505(a)] allows
legal advice and representation." See id. at 4. But at oral argument, Solicitor General
Elena Kagan maintained the government's position that the statute bars legal advice
and representation such as the filing of an amicus brief. See Transcript of Oral
Argument at 46-47, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, Nos. 08-1498, 09-89 (U.S.
Feb. 23, 2010) (arguing that while the statute does not bar a petitioner from drafting
an amicus brief for a case involving an organization prohibited by the statute, it does
bar a petitioner from drafting such a brief for the organization itself).
74. Humanitarian Law Project, 552 F.3d at 930.
75. Id. at 928 (citation and internal punctuation omitted).
76. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
Nos. 08-1498, 09-89 (U.S.June 4, 2009).
77. Opening Br. for Humanitarian Law Project, Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, Nos. 08-1498, 09-89 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2009).
78. Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26, Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, Nos. 08-1498, 09-89 (U.S. June 6, 2009) (internal punctuation omitted).
79. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2723 (2010).
80. Id. at. 2724.
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characterization s l as well as the plaintiffs' pure political speech claim.
Instead, the Court determined that "l[t] he law here may be described
as directed at conduct.., but as applied to plaintiffs the conduct
triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a
message. As such, "a more demanding standard"s3 of review is
warranted, though the Court did not specifically characterize the test
applied as one of strict scrutiny.84
The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld the ban as
applied to the plaintiffs in the limited circumstances of (1) training
how to use humanitarian and international law to peacefully resolve
disputes; and (2) teaching how to petition various representative
bodies like the United Nations. 85 The Court left open the possibility
that engaging in political advocacy on behalf of groups like the Kurds
and the Tamil Tigers would violate the law as well, but found that the
proposed advocacy was "phrased at such a high level of generality
that [the plaintiffs] cannot prevail in this preenforcement
challenge. 86
Upholding the ban, the majority noted that "[e]veryone agrees
that the Government's interest in combating terrorism is an urgent
objective of the highest order," and found significant both Congress's
"specific findings regarding the serious threat posed by international
terrorism" as well as the Executive Branch's conclusion in an affidavit
that "the experience and analysis of Government agencies charged
with combating terrorism strongly support Congress's finding that all
contributions to foreign terrorist organizations.., further those
groups' terrorist activities. 87  In a strongly worded dissent, Justice
Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, wrote:
[T]he Government has not made the strong showing necessary to
justify under the First Amendment the criminal prosecution of
those who engage in ... communication and advocacy of political
ideas and lawful means of achieving political ends .... That this
kind of speech and association for political purposes is the kind of
81. See id. at 2723 ("The Government is wrong that the only thing actually at issue
in this litigation is conduct.").
82. Id. at 2724.
83. Id. (quotingTexas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989)).
84. See id. at 2734 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also discussion of strict scrutiny,
supra n. 46 Whether the Court created a new level of scrutiny for speech restrictions
involving national defense or war on terrorism concerns has been the subject of
speculation by commentators. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Humanitarian Law Project
and Strict Scrutiny (June 21, 2010), available at http://volokh.com/2010/06/21/
humanitarian-law-project-and-strict-scrutiny/.
85. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. at 2729.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2710 (internal punctuation and citations omitted).
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activity to which the First Amendment ordinarily offers its strongest
protection is elementary.8
Moreover, Justice Breyer pointed out that "the First Amendment
protects advocacy even of unlawful action so long as that advocacy is
not 'directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action,' 89 and
"[n]o one contends that the plaintiffs' speech to these organizations
can be prohibited as incitement."90
Chief Justice Robert was careful to make clear that the holding in
Humanitarian Law Project should not be understood "to say that any
future applications of the material-support statute to speech or
advocacy will survive First Amendment scrutiny. " 9' He further
cautioned that the opinion does not "address the resolution of more
difficult cases that may arise under the statute in the future."9 Thus,
the Court did not rule specifically on the ban's application to legal
advice or amicus advocacy. The holding of this case, however, is
likely to have a chilling effect on attorney advice, as Justice Breyer
suggested in his dissent:
It is inordinately difficult to distinguish when speech activity will
and when it will not initiate the chain of causation the Court
suggests-a chain that leads from peaceful advocacy to "legitimacy"
to increased support for the group to an increased supply of
material goods that support its terrorist activities. Even were we to
find some such line of distinction, its application would seem so
inherently uncertain that it would often, perhaps always, "chill"
protected speech beyond its boundary.93
As in Milavetz, the Supreme Court's treatment of this federal
statutory constraint on attorney advice may very well have significant
ramifications for lawyers and clients. The results of these cases may
have considerable repercussions for clients who need complete and
accurate legal advice about bankruptcy or humanitarian aid efforts,
and for their attorneys who are under ethical obligations to deliver
that information. The Supreme Court's ruling in these cases also
may adversely impact the ability of attorneys to offer advice in other
areas of law, for an affirmation of these statutory restrictions on legal
advice potentially emboldens Congress to impose similar restraints in
other areas of law.
88. Id. at 2732 (emphasis in original, citations omitted).
89. Id. at 2733 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per
curiam) ) (emphasis in original)
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2730.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2736.
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The next three fee-shifting statute cases turn on a concern related
to accessing legal advice-the availability of attorneys to provide
advice.
2. Access to legal representation via fee-shifting statutes
Three attorneys' fees cases decided by the Court bring to light
another aspect of a client's right or ability to access legal advice: the
availability of attorneys' fees in cases where, absent a meaningful fee-
shifting statute attached to the relief sought, potential clients would
be left without a lawyer to take up their case.94 And, consequently,
parties seeking enforcement or redress would have no access to legal
advice or meaningful legal representation. 95
The default standard for determining the payment of attorneys'
fees is the so-called American Rule, under which each side must bear
its own expenses regardless of the outcome. 96 Fee-shifting statutes
alter the default rule, requiring the losing party to pay the prevailing
party's expenses. 97  The purpose of fee-shifting statutes is to
encourage private citizens to vindicate important public rights that
otherwise might go unaddressed due to an inability to cover the
94. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 336 F. Appx. 332, 336 (4th Cir.
2009) (per curiam) (clarifying the requirements for fee-shifting), rev'd and remanded,
130 S. Ct. 2149, 2156 (2010); Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800, 801 (8th Cir. 2008)
(determining entitlement for fee-shifting statutes), rev'd and remanded, 130 S. Ct.
2521, 2524 (2010); Kenny A. ex. rel Winn v. Purdue, 532 F.3d 1209, 1214 (11th Cir.
2008) (determining when fee award may be enhanced), rev'd and remanded 130 S. Ct.
1662, 1669 (2010).
95. Unless, of course, they are fortunate enough to receive assistance from a
community legal aid organization, law school clinic, or pro bono representation.
These resources, however, are insufficient to satisfy the growing unmet need for legal
services, especially for enforcement of civil rights and economic benefit statutes. See,
for example, QuintinJohnstone, An Overview of the Legal Profession in the United States,
how that Profession Recently has been Changing, and Its Future Prospects, 26 QUINNIPIAC L.
REv. 737, 771-72 (2008), explaining:
The main reason for the extensive lack of legal services for the poor and
the frequent inadequacy of many of the legal services that are provided the
poor is the insufficient funding of these services by both government and
private sources. The total annual amount of funding for civil legal services
for the poor in the United States as of 2005 was about 1 billion dollars a
year, of which the federal government contribution was about thirty
percent of the total amount, the state government contribution was about
seven percent, and the remainder came from other public and private
sources.
96. See Walter Olson, Loser Pays, POINT OF LAw, May 21, 2005, http://
www.pointoflaw.com/loserpays/overview.php (asserting that the United States is the
only western democracy that still requires each side to pay their own expenses, and
arguing for the abandonment of this requirement in favor of a rule that requires the
loser to pay litigation cost).
97. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006) ("In any action or proceeding to enforce
[civil fights laws], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs .. ").
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attorneys' fees and costs involved. Congress has employed fee-
shifting statutes since the mid-1960s to ensure the enforcement of
civil rights statutes98 and has attached them to other important social
and economic statutes as well."
As Professor Samuel Bagenstos explains, "[s]tatutes shifting
responsibility for plaintiffs' attorneys' fees to unsuccessful defendants
are central to ensuring access to justice for people of limited means
in civil rights, environmental, and other public interest cases. ' 1°°
Professor Bagenstos notes several advantages of fee-shifting for these
kinds of cases: "[b]ecause lawyers in fee-shifting cases get paid only
when they win, they have an incentive to find and bring cases in
which a court is likely to conclude that someone's legal rights
were actually violated."' ' The decentralizing feature of fee-shifting
statutes, he points out, means that:
Public funding or employment of lawyers for less well-off person [s]
places them at the whim of government decisions about what sorts
of clients should be represented, what sorts of litigation should be
brought, what sorts of remedies should be sought, and so forth.
But a fee-shifting system equally subsidizes litigation for any
violation of legal rights covered by a fee-shifting statute-whether
or not the particular client or case is likely to be politically popular.
And unlike systems of public financing of litigation-whose costs
are borne by taxpayers generally-fee-shifting statutes place the
burden of financing access to justice squarely on those entities that
have actually violated the law (at least in the first instance).02
Realization of the benefits highlighted by Professor Bagenstos
necessarily assumes that the fee-shifting statute is applied in a
98. See Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an
Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REv. 1097, 1136
(2006) (detailing Congress' abandonment of the American Rule in civil rights cases).
99. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 11, Perdue v. Kenny A. ex. rel. Winn,
130 S. Ct. 1662 (2009) (No. 08-970) (citation omitted) (recognizing that there are
"at least one hundred federal fee-shifting statutes that allow the prevailing party to
recover a reasonable attorney's fee from the losing party").
100. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Thurgood Marshall, Meet Adam Smith: How Fee-Shifting
Statutes Provide a Market-Based System for Promoting Access to Justice (Though Some Judges
Don't Get It), 1 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 150, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract-1407275. But not everyone agrees that fee-shifting statutes encourage access
tojustice. For example, University of Calgary Law Professor Alice Wooley argues that
a fee-shifting statute can act as a barrier for an individual who has pro bono
representation but does not have the ability to pay the other side's
attorneys' fees if unsuccessful. See Posting of Alice Wooley to Legal Ethics Forum,
http://www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2010/01/supreme-court-agrees-to-hear-
another-feeshifting-statute-case.html (Jan. 16, 2010, 09:34 EST).
101. Bagenstos, supra note 100, at 1.
102. Id. at 1-2.
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meaningful and robust way. Historically, however, the Supreme
Court has interpreted fee-shifting statutes narrowly, limiting the
circumstances when attorneys' fees must be paid'3 and even allowing
for fees to be completely negotiated away in a settlement. 10 4 Most
recently the Court held that a party is not a "prevailing party" for
purposes of the fee award unless deemed such by judicial decree,
even if all relief sought is obtained.0 5 As Professor Andrew Siegel
concludes:
[B]y limiting the availability of fees to situations in which the
plaintiff obtains a judicially enforceable judgment or decree that
provides significant betterment of his condition (through
substantial damages or a consequential injunction), the [Court]
require[s] an attorney.., to evaluate not only the underlying
merits of the plaintiffs claim but also such extraneous variables as
the likelihood that the action will become moot, the possibility that
relief will come through non-judicial channels, and the scope of
any potential damage award.' °6
The result is that an attorney may decline to accept even a highly
meritorious case, therefore circumventing the congressional purpose
behind enactment of the fee-shifting statute.
The Court's grant of certiorari to three cases in this category
during the 2009 term indicates an awareness of the significance that a
fee-shifting statute may have on the realization of the underlying
relief sought. Moreover, while each case addressed a different fee-
shifting statute, fee-shifting provisions generally are interpreted
consistently' 7 so the outcomes of these cases potentially may have far-
reaching results.'0
103. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (per curiam) (holding that a
declaratory judgment ordering a change in prison policies did not constitute a
victory on which attorneys' fees could be based where one co-plaintiff had already
been released from prison and the other co-plaintiff had died); Hewitt v. Helms,
482 U.S. 755, 759-60 (1987) (holding that an interlocutory ruling that one's
complaint should not have been dismissed does not render one a prevailing party for
the purposes of attorneys' fees).
104. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 720 (1986) (holding that a district court
may refuse to award fees where the plaintiff waives them as part of a settlement).
105. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001) (finding, contrary to the majority of the circuits, that
attorneys' fees cannot be awarded under a catalyst theory-where the plaintiff
achieves the desired outcome because the litigation led to a voluntary change in the
defendant's conduct).
106. Siegel, supra note 98, at 1137.
107. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc., 532 U.S. at 603 n.4 (stating that the
Court approaches an assessment of such provisions with an understanding that
"[they] have interpreted these fee-shifting provisions consistently.").
108. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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a. An attorney's entitlement to the fee-shifting award: Astrue v. Ratliff
Astrue v. Ratliff09 raised a basic, but important, question regarding
attorneys' fees and federal fee-shifting statutes: does a fee award
belong to the attorney or the client? Attorney Catherine Ratliff
"successfully represented two claimants in their efforts to receive
benefits from the Social Security Administration."" After her victory,
she requested payment of her fees and costs under the Equal Access
to Justice Act ("EAJA"). l ' The EAJA is a federal fee-shifting statute
that allows "prevailing parties" in civil actions against the United
States to recover fees and other costs in certain cases. 1 2 The district
court granted Ratliffs request, but the government reduced her
award because of debt that her client owed the United States
government. 1 3 Ratliff challenged the government's action under the
Fourth Amendment, arguing that it constituted an illegal seizure, but
the district court held she lacked standing "because the fees were
awarded to the parties, not their attorney.,114
The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that "EAJA attorneys' fees are
awarded to the prevailing parties' attorneys."' 1 It did so in the face of
contradictory precedent from other jurisdictions, in particular the
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits.1 6 The court noted, however, that the
result was based upon controlling Eighth Circuit cases and "[w]ere
[it] deciding this case in the first instance, [it might] well agree with
[its] sister circuits.""1
7
Predictably, in its petition for certiorari, the government argued
that the Supreme Court should follow those courts holding that fees
awarded to a prevailing party under the EAJA are property of the
client, not the attorney." 8 Ratliff countered that the Eighth Circuit
correctly held attorneys are entitled to EAJA awards regardless of the
government's asserted right to collect debts the client owes.119
109. Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800 (8th Cir. 2008), rev'd and remanded, Astrue v.
Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. 2521, 2524 (2010).
110. Id.at801.
111. Id. The Equal Access to Justice Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2006).
112. §2412(a)(1).
113. Ratliff 540 F.3d at 801. At issue was a fee awarded in the amount of
$2,239.35, all of which was offset by the government to satisfy the client's pre-existing
federal debt. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4-5, Astrue v. Ratliff, No. 08-1322
(U.S. Apr. 28, 2009).
114. Ratliff 540 F.3d at 801.
115. Id. at802.
116. Id. at 801-02 (citing cases).
117. Id. at801-02.
118. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 113, at 7.
119. Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 21, Astrue v. Ratliff, No. 08-1322 (U.S.
June 25, 2009).
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Further, she noted that the Eighth Circuit's acknowledgement of an
attorney's "protectable property interest in an EAJA fee once it is
awarded" was a position "find[ing] strong support in the long-
established rule that an attorney's interest in a fee for her efforts
creates a lien allowing equitable tracing of funds that have been
transferred to other creditors of the client."1 20 Thus, it follows that
"the attorney's equitable lien is itself a property interest subject to
constitutional protection against government confiscation,"
irrespective of "who has the right to apply for an attorney fee . .. or
even to receive it in the first instance. '21
Ratliff also suggested the consequences of a reversal would leave
few attorneys, if any, to assist Social Security claimants given the risk
of receiving no compensation, "even in those cases where they not
only succeed, but [also] where the government's position was not...
justified., 122 She argued that the purpose of fee-shifting statutes-"to
encourage attorneys to take meritorious cases challenging
government action and thereby allow even the indigent to enforce
the rule of law-is satisfied only if an attorney who earns a fee
receives it.' 12  The absence of a guaranteed fee for successful
representation translates into an absence of lawyers to undertake the
representation.
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding unanimously that an EAJA
fee award belongs to the client, not the attorney.124 As such, the fee
award can be seized by the federal government to satisfy the client's
debt obligation.125 Justice Thomas authored the opinion, explaining
that a textual reading of the statue makes clear "that courts shall
award to a prevailing party fees and other expenses."2 6 Further, he
noted that the Court has "long held that the term 'prevailing party' in
fee statutes is a term of art that refers to the prevailing litigant," not
the litigant's attorney.121
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, wrote a
separate concurring opinion, acknowledging the concerns raised by
Ratliff. While Justice Sotomayor agreed that fees awarded under
120. Id. at 22.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 29.
123. Respondent's Brief at 39, Astrue v. Ratliff, No. 08-1322 (U.S.Jan. 8, 2010).
124. Astre v. Ratliff, 130S. Ct. 2521, 2524 (2010) ("We hold that a § 2412(d) award
is payable to the litigant and is therefore subject to a Government offset to satisfy a
pre-existing debt that the litigant owes the United States.").
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2525 (internal punctuation and citation omitted).
127. Id. (internal punctuation and citation omitted).
128. Id. at 2529-33.
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the EAJA are payable to the litigant rather than the attorney, and that
"the litigant's obligation to pay her attorney is controlled not by the
EAJA but by contract and the law governing that contract," she
observed that "it is likely both that Congress did not consider that
question and that, had it done so, it would not have wanted EAJA fee
awards to be subject to offset."'9 In particular, she criticized the
offset as "undercut[ting] the effectiveness of the EAJA" and suggested
that Congress "perhaps will in the future make the opposite
choice. 130 In short, she wrote: "[t] he EAJA's admirable purpose will
be undercut if lawyers fear that they will never actually receive
attorney's fees to which a court has determined the prevailing party is
entitled. The point of an award of attorney's fees, after all, is to
enable a prevailing litigant to pay her attorney.",131
b. Revisiting the prevailing party requirement for fee-shifting statutes:
Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co.
A second fee-shifting statute case sought clarification about the
prevailing party requirement. In Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life
Insurance Co., 132 the plaintiffs attorney successfully represented Hardt
in obtaining the relief she sought-a reversal by Reliance of its initial
decision to deny her long-term disability benefits for carpal tunnel
syndrome. The district court granted her motion, observing that
because "on remand, Hardt received precisely the benefits she had
sought, she meets the definition of a prevailing party and is eligible
for an award of attorney's fees" in the amount of nearly $40,000.13
Significantly, there was no judgment on the merits or judicially
sanctioned relief. Thus, Reliance argued "that at best, this is a case of
'tactical mooting,"' with no judgment on the merits entitling the
plaintiff to fees.3 5 In other words, there was no prevailing party. On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed with Reliance.
3 6
The Fourth Circuit held that Hardt was not a prevailing party, and
reversed the district court's award of attorneys' fees under ERISA §
502(g) (1).137 Hardt appealed to the Supreme Court, presenting two
129. Id. at 2530.
130. Id. at 2530 (internal punctuation omitted).
131. Id.
132. 336 F. Appx. 332 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), rev'd and remanded, 130 S. Ct.
2149, 2156 (2010).
133. Id. at 333 (describing the condition as so severe that Hardt could no longer
continue to work as an administrative assistant).
134. Id. at 334.
135. Id. at 336.
136. Id. at 336.
137. Id. at 333.
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questions: first, "whether... a district court [has] discretion to award
reasonable attorney's fees only to a prevailing party;" and second,
"whether a party is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to [the ERISA
statute] when she ... secures a judicially ordered remand... and
subsequently receives the relief sought."'38 Hardt argued that
attorneys would be reluctant to represent future ERISA plaintiffs in
pursuit of their rightful entitlements if denied fees in situations like
this.
13 9
And this time the Court agreed, holding that under the ERISA fee-
shifting statue, "a court in its discretion may award fees and costs to
either party as long as the fee claimant has achieved some degree of
success on the merits."' 4  Justice Thomas authored another
unanimous opinion, and again followed a textual reading of the fee-
shifting statute. Because the term "prevailing party" does not appear
in the ERISA fee-shifting statute, the Court declined to incorporate
this requirement.' 1 Instead, the statute requires only "some success
on the merits," under which the Court found that "the District Court
properly exercised its discretion to award Hardt attorney's fees in this
,,142
case.
The third fee-shifting statute case heard by the Court involved a
similar concern regarding the reluctance of attorneys to take on
difficult but worthy cases when the fee award is uncertain.
c. Enhancingfee-shifting awards for extra effort: Perdue v. Kenny A.
ex rel. Winn
The third fee-shifting case, Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn,1
43
examined when, if ever, an award under a federal fee-shifting statute
may "be enhanced based solely on quality of performance and results
obtained, or [whether] these factors already are included in the
lodestar calculation."'" The default standard for calculating a fee
award is based upon the lodestar formula, a tool applied by courts to
assess an appropriate compensation award for attorneys representing
138. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i-ii, Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.,
No. 09-448 (U.S. Oct. 14, 2009).
139. Brief for Petitioner at 33, Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 09-448
(U.S. Oct. 14, 2009).
140. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S.Ct. 2149, 2156(2010)
(internal punctuation and citation omitted).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2159 (citations omitted).
143. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1296-97 (N.D. Ga.
2006), affd, 532 F.3d 1209, 1214-15, 1242 (11th Cir. 2008), rev'd and remanded
130 S. Ct. 1662, 1669 (2010).
144. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at i, Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct.
1662 (2010) (No. 08-970) (emphasis added).
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the prevailing party under a fee-shifting statute. 4 5  The formula
multiplies the reasonable number of hours worked on a case by a
reasonable hourly rate that reflects the skill and experience of the
attorneys seeking the fee award, and a court may enhance the
lodestar calculation on the basis of performance and results only in
exceptional circumstances.
46
This case stemmed from a Georgia federal district court's award of
$10.5 million to a group of attorneys who represented a class of 3,000
foster children against the State of Georgia in constitutional and
statutory challenges directed toward the foster care system for
two metropolitan Atlanta counties. 147  Of that award, $4.5 million
represented an enhancement to the lodestar calculation.4 8  The
enhancement, or bonus, was based upon the district court's
assessment that the quality of legal representation "was far superior to
what consumers of legal services in the legal marketplace in Atlanta
could reasonably expect to receive for the rates used in the lodestar
calculation,"4 9 or in other words, the quality of performance and the
results obtained. The district court judge based the fee award on his
belief that the resolution of the foster care class action was
unprecedented in its success. 5 0 The case spanned more than three
years, concluding with a consent decree in which the State agreed to
take thirty-one separate steps to improve the situation of foster
children, including obligations such as prompt investigation of abuse
145. Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1673 (explaining that the lodestar formula attempts to
compensate attorneys in fee-shifting cases in line with market rates).
146. See id. at 1672-73. Reasonableness is assessed by a number of factors
including:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the
preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5)
the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount
involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability
of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in
similar cases.
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 n.3 (1983).
147. 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1669 (2010).
148. See Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1670 (explaining that the lodestar fee of
$6,012,802.90 should be adjusted upward by a multiplier of 1.75, resulting in a total
fee award of over $10.5 million).
149. Perdue, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1288. The District Court further observed that
"[a] fter 58 years as a practicing attorney and federal judge, th[is] Court is unaware of
any other case in which a plaintiff class has achieved such a favorable result on such a
comprehensive scale." Id. at 1290.
150. See id. at 1290 (recounting the court's investigatory actions that led to the
lodestar calculation's multiplication by 1.75).
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or neglect reports, regular visits by caseworkers, licensing of foster
homes, and timely delivery of medical and dental care."'
The State of Georgia appealed the award but a unanimous panel of
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's award, though it did
so with serious reservations. 11 In particular, the court observed that
the district court's enhancement "cannot be squared with...
Supreme Court [precedent]," and reached the "conclusion that the
enhancement to the lodestar amount in this case was improper."
53
Nevertheless, "under the prior panel precedent rule [the court was]
not free to decide the enhancement issue."154 As such, though the
court was "convinced" that the prior Eleventh Circuit precedent was
"wrong and conflict[ed] with relevant Supreme Court decisions," it
felt "bound to follow it"'55 and upheld the award. 56 After the denial
of a rehearing en banc, 5 7 the State petitioned for review.
In its petition to the Supreme Court, the State of Georgia argued
that the results obtained in a case, and the quality of work done on a
case, are considerations to be taken into account only when initially
calculating the basic lodestar fee amount.1 5 8  It constitutes double-
counting, so the argument goes, to consider those factors again in
awarding an enhancement, bonus, or other additional amount. The
United States filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the State of
Georgia, maintaining that:
Enhancements based on the quality of representation or the results
obtained are not necessary to satisfy the aim of fee-shifting statutes.
Congress designed these statutes to enable private parties to attract
competent counsel to help vindicate important federal rights, but
151. Id. at 1289; see also Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, supra note 99, at 4-6
(discussing the volume of hours spent by counsel preparing for and mediating the
case).
152. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 532 F.3d at 1242. Among those reservations the court
noted that
[t]he multi-million dollar enhancement, over and beyond the full lodestar
sum.., amounts to an involuntary, federal court ordered contribution from
the taxpayers of Georgia to a non-profit organization. The perverse irony of
the seven figure, court ordered gratuity in this case is that it reduces the
amount of state funds available to care for [the children that the litigation
sought to protect].
Id. at 1236.
153. Id. at 1225, 1233.
154. Id. at 1236 (explaining that the court was constrained to following its earlier
rulings in NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1331 (11th Cir. 1987) and Norman v.
Housing Authority of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292 (lth Cir. 1988)).
155. Id. at 1238 (citing Hurth v. Mitchem, 400 F.3d 857, 862 (lth Cir. 2005)
("[W]e are not permitted to reach a result contrary to a prior panel's decision merely
because we are convinced it is wrong. )).
156. Id. at 1242.
157. Kenny A. ex reL Winn v. Perdue, 547 F.3d 1319, 1320 (2008).
158. See Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, supra note 99, at 13-14.
1525
HeinOnline -- 59 Am. U. L. Rev. 1525 2009-2010
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Congress also cautioned that attorney's fee awards should not
produce windfalls.5 9
Furthermore, "[i]n the rare case in which representation of an
unpopular or otherwise highly controversial client causes counsel to
suffer professional or financial harm, the lodestar amount may be
insufficient and an enhancement appropriate. But no such special
circumstances are present in this case. ""° In support of this position,
the United States pointed to Supreme Court precedent showing that
the "Court has steadily distanced itself from the notion that an
enhancement... may be based on quality of representation or results
obtained, even in 'exceptional' cases."
16 1
In response, the attorneys seeking enforcement of the fee award
focused on the district court's decision and the Eleventh Circuit's
denial of a rehearing en banc, in which Judge Wilson concurred. He
explained that "[s]everal decades of established Supreme Court
precedent make it clear that district judges are vested with discretion
to enhance a fee in accordance with a federal fee-shifting statute...
when there is specific evidence in the record to support an
exceptional result and superior performance." 62  Judge Wilson
concluded that Perdue "is that case," and Judge Tjoflat emphasized in
his own dissent that the district court provided precisely the sort of
specific facts required to support an enhancement.
163
The Supreme Court held that an enhancement to an award under
a fee-shifting statute may be permitted "in extraordinary
159. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae SupportingPetitioners at 9-10,
Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662 (2009) (No. 08-970).
160. Id. at 10.
161. Id. at 17 (discussing cases where the Court incorporated elements in a basic
lodestar calculation that circuit courts were erroneously considering to be
enhancements). The government also noted that the ABA Model Rules require that
"[a]n attorney who accepts a case arising under a fee-shifting statute is ethically
obligated, as is any attorney in any case, to represent her client to the best of her
legal ability," regardless of compensation. Id. at 29. Accordingly, "[p]ursuant to
these professional norms, lawyers every day provide best efforts for fees similar to
what respondents' counsel would receive under the lodestar award, without any
prospect of substantial monetary bonuses." Id. Indeed, the lawyers in Perdue took on
and successfully carried out their representation without any expectation of an
enhancement. See Tony Mauro & Marcia Coyle, Judges Back Fee Enhancements But Only
in Rare Circumstances, NEW YoRK LAWJOURNAL, April 22, 2010, http://www.law.com/
jsp/nylj/PubAricleNY.jsp?id=1202448453777 (interviewing Marcia Robinson Lowry,
executive director of Children's Rights, Inc.-the group of lawyers representing the
plaintiff class in Perdue--who explained "that fee enhancements like the one
requested in this case are rare, occurring an average of once each year in the entire
federal system").
162. Respondents' Brief at 12, Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662
(2009) (No. 08-970) (quoting Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 547 F.3d at 1320 (Wilson, J.,
concurring)).
163. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 547 F.3d at 1321-22 (TjoflatJ., dissenting).
1526 [Vol. 59:1499
HeinOnline -- 59 Am. U. L. Rev. 1526 2009-2010
2010] INCREASED ATTENTION TO THE LAW OF LAWYERING
circumstances," but reversed the $4.5 million bonus at issue in
Perdue.164 Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Alito explained:
[T]here is a strong presumption that the lodestar is sufficient;
factors subsumed in the lodestar calculation cannot be used as a
ground for increasing an award above the lodestar; and a party
seeking fees has the burden of identifying a factor that the lodestar
does not adequately take into account and proving with specificity
that an enhanced fee is justified. Because the District Court did
165
not apply these standards, we reverse ....
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsberg, and Sotomayor,
wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. 66 Justice
Breyer agreed with the majority's conclusion that "when 'superior
attorney performance' [] leads to 'exceptional success an enhanced
award may be justified.' 167 However, he would have held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the
enhancement in this case, an issue "which lies beyond the narrow
question that [the Court] agreed to consider.,
168
In his dissent, Justice Breyer reached the conclusion that the lower
court's original determination was not an abuse of discretion for four
reasons, explaining:
First, the record indicates that the lawyers' objective in this case
was unusually important and fully consistent with the central
objectives of the basic federal civil-rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983..
Second, the course of the lawsuit was lengthy and arduous....
Third, in the face of this opposition, the results obtained by the
plaintiffs' attorneys appear to have been exceptional....
Fourth and finally, the District Judge, who supervised these
proceedings, who saw the plaintiffs amass, process, compile, and
convincingly present vast amounts of factual information, who
witnessed their defeat of numerous state procedural and
substantive motions, and who was in a position to evaluate the
ultimate mediation effort .... [found, among other observations]
"that... counsel brought a higher degree of skill, commitment,
dedication, and professionalism to this litigation than the [district
164. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. at 1669.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1678 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
167. Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983)).
168. Id.
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judge] ha[d] seen displayed by the attorneys in any other case
,,169during its 27 years on the bench.
He also pointed out that the district court would not be prohibited
"from awarding an enhanced fee on remand if that court provides
more detailed reasoning supporting its decision."
7 0
Compensation guaranteed by fee-shifting statutes undoubtedly
influences attorneys to take on representations where parties
otherwise would be left with no legal advice (and, in cases like these,
with no assistance in obtaining wrongly-denied benefits). Thus, in an
important way, the attorneys' fees cases intertwine with those cases
addressing access to attorney advice and, in particular, the right or
ability of clients to access necessary legal assistance. Another case
taken up by the Court this term identified comparable concerns
regarding access to legal advice in a different context-the protection
afforded to attorney-client privilege claims during civil trials.
3. Preserving access to legal advice through the immediate appeal of a
disputed attorney-client privilege waiver: Mohawk Industries, Inc. v.
Carpenter
Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter'7 involved a question of civil
procedure, asking "whether a party has an immediate appeal [under
the collateral order doctrine]' of [a] district court's order finding
waiver of the attorney-client privilege and compelling production of
privileged materials.' '173 The Supreme Court took up the case to
reconcile a circuit split and held that such a party does not have a
right to an immediate appeal. 74  Rather, the Court observed,
"[p]ostjudgment appeals, together with other review mechanisms,
suffice to protect the rights of litigants and preserve the vitality of the
attorney-client privilege.'
This case was sparked by a dispute between Mohawk Industries and
its employee, Norman Carpenter, who alleged that he was terminated
unlawfully after reporting to Mohawk's human resources department
that several temporary employees were illegal aliens. During the
course of discovery, Carpenter requested information from a meeting
169. Id. at 1679-1682 (citation omitted).
170. Id. at 1684.
171. 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009).
172. The collateral order doctrine provides for an immediate appeal in limited
situations. See infra notes 181-183 and accompanying text.
173. Reply Brief at 1, Mohawk Indus., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 599 (No. 08-678).
174. Carpenter v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 541 F.3d 1048, 1050 (11th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam), affd, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 603 (2009).
175. Id.
176. 130 S. Ct. 599, 609 (2009).
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that took place between Mohawk's attorney and him in an unrelated
case, as well as information about Mohawk's decision to terminate his
employment.1 77 Mohawk refused to provide the documents on the
basis of attorney-client privilege, leading Carpenter to move to
compel discovery. 78  While the district court agreed "that the
communications at issue were protected by the attorney-client
privilege.., it went on to conclude that [Mohawk] had implicitly
waived the attorney-client privilege due to the response [it] filed in
[an unrelated] action. Mohawk, believing it had not waived the
privilege, sought an appeal of the decision based upon the collateral
order doctrine.' 80
The Supreme Court set forth the collateral order doctrine in Cohen
v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.'8' The doctrine provides an
exception to the final judgment rule and the corresponding principle
that "[g]enerally, discovery orders are not final orders ... for
purposes of obtaining appellate jurisdiction."' s2  Thus, "[u]nder
Cohen, an order is appealable [only] if it (1) conclusively determines
the disputed question; (2) resolves an important issue completely
separate from the merits of the action; and (3) is effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."'83
While the Eleventh Circuit found the first two prongs satisfied in
this case, regarding the third prong it found "that a discovery order
that implicates the attorney-client privilege is [not] effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. ' , 84 For example, the
court explained that,
If [it] were to determine on appeal from a final judgment that
privileged information was wrongly turned over and was used to the
detriment of the party asserting the privilege, [it] could reverse any
adverse judgment and require a new trial, forbidding any use of the
improperly disclosed information, as well as any documents,
witnesses, or other evidence obtained as a consequence of the
improperly disclosed information. 18
Acknowledging that other circuits have reached an opposite result,
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a discovery order compelling the
177. Id. at 1051.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1052.
181. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
182. Mohawk, 541 F.3d at 1052.
183. Id. at 1052 (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)).
184. Id.
185. Id.
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disclosure of privileged information cannot be appealed before final
judgment."6 Instead, the court suggested that mandamus or a
challenge to a contempt order following noncompliance might
provide alternative mechanisms for review,' 87 notwithstanding the
practical difficulties associated with these options and the
extraordinary costs involved with a new trial.188
In its brief to the Supreme Court, petitioner Mohawk focused on
the importance of the attorney-client privilege in the context of the
justice system, an issue glossed over in the Eleventh Circuit opinion.
Mohawk explained:
The attorney-client privilege lies at the heart of our adversary
system, promotes loyalty and trust between attorney and client, and
advances the broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice. Because the attorney-client privilege is
deeply rooted in public policy and essential to achieving a healthy
legal system, a district court order that compromises the privilege
by compelling the disclosure of privileged information threatens
rights critical to the public good and is sufficiently important to
warrant collateral order jurisdiction, outweighing the traditional
concerns of piecemeal appeals. s9
Moreover, Mohawk reasoned that if it was forced "to wait until after a
final judgment to appeal the District Court's order, the right Mohawk
seeks to protect, namely, the right not to disclose privileged
information, will have been destroyed. It is this right of non-
disclosure that is at the heart of the attorney-client privilege .... 90
Mohawk went on to clarify that, "as the Third, Ninth, and D.C.
Circuits have recognized, an appeal after final judgment cannot
remedy the breach of confidentiality occasioned by erroneous
disclosure of privileged material. Once the privileged information is
disclosed, 'there is no way to unscramble the egg scrambled by the
186. See id. at 1053 (listing cases from the Third, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits that
have held that the collateral order doctrine allows review of an order compelling the
production of attorney-client communication, and cases from the First, Second,
Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and Federal Circuits stating that it does not).
187. Id. at 1054-55.
188. See, e.g., Michael P. Shea, Allow Prompt Appeals, NAT'L L. J., Apr. 13, 2009,
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202429788127 (explaining that
"mandamus-an extraordinary remedy reserved for 'clear abuses of discretion' by
the trial judge-is a poor fit for orders denying privilege claims" and that the
contempt order for non-compliance "is even worse" in that for most parties
"enduring the penalties and stigma associated with a contempt sanction is simply not
a feasible option"); see also Brief for Petitioner at 32-40, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v.
Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009) (No. 08-678) (discussing problems associated with
mandamus and contempt).
189. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 188188, at 10.
190. Id. at 11-12.
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disclosure."' '  For example, adverse parties "cannot unlearn what
has been disclosed to them,,192 and "allowing an adversary to see
privileged documents that are later held inadmissible at retrial 'may
alert adversary counsel to evidentiary leads or give insights regarding
various claims or defenses.'
193
In his opposition brief, Carpenter pointed to precedent disallowing
an immediate appeal of discovery orders, including privilege rulings,
based upon the final judgment rule and concerns of judicial
administration.194 Applying the criteria for collateral order review, he
argued that none of the factors were satisfied here for four reasons:
first, "privilege rulings are inconclusive because they are particularly
subject to reconsideration;" second, they "are not completely separate
from the merits;" third, "privilege claims are not important enough to
overcome the final judgment rule;" and finally, "orders denying
attorney-client privilege claims are not effectively unreviewable after
final judgment."095  Carpenter also made the case that allowing an
immediate appeal would result in a flood of appeals, along with
unnecessary delay in the trial process, if a party were to demand an
immediate appeal any time the attorney-client privilege is invoked,
even on the witness stand. 196
The Supreme Court agreed with Carpenter.' 97 For the Court, "the
decisive consideration [wa]s whether delaying review until the entry
of final judgment 'would imperil a substantial public interest' or
191. Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
192. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Bar Association in Support of Petitioner
at 15, Mohawk Indus., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 599 (No. 08-678) (quoting Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964 F.2d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 1992)).
193. Id. (quoting Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 964 F.2d at 165).
194. See Brief for Respondent at 10-11, Mohawk Indus., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 599
(No. 08-678) (discussing cases in which the Supreme Court held that orders
enforcing discovery requests are not suitable for immediate appeal because they are
not "final order[s]," and that this rule holds true even for questions of privilege in
cases that involve Constitutional rights, such as Fifth Amendment protections)
(quoting Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 n.11 (1992));
see also id. at 11 (recognizing that the Supreme Court "has repeatedly cautioned
against opening the door to appeals that would undermine 'the deference owed by
appellate courts to trial judges charged with managing the discovery process'")
(quoting Cunningham v. Hamilton County, Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 209 (1999)).
195. Id. at 8-9.
196. Id. at 46. But see Brief for Petitioner at 14, Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter,
130 S. Ct. 599 (Jan. 20, 2010) (No. 08-678) ("[T]he available evidence shows that the
three circuits that have allowed collateral order review of orders compelling the
disclosure of information claimed to be subject to the attorney-client privilege have
dealt with a total of approximately eleven such appeals since 1997. Of these appeals,
only three fell into the category at issue here .. ").
197. See Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 603 (holding that "disclosure orders adverse to the
attorney-client privilege [do not] qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral
order doctrine").
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'some particular value of a high order.'"1 98 The Court acknowledged
Mohawk's argument that attorney-client privilege is fundamental to
ensuring confidential communications and even accepted
Mohawk's contentions about the need to fully protect privilege,
observing that:
By assuring confidentiality, the privilege encourages clients to
make full and frank disclosures to their attorneys, who are then
better able to provide candid advice and effective representation.
This, in turn, serves broader public interests in the observance of
200law and administration ofjustice.
The Court further recognized that some of the orders affecting
attorney-client privilege could influence litigation in such a way that
could not be easily remedied by post-decision appeals. °1
But the alternative was not a result the Court could accept, for
allowing parties to undertake piecemeal appeals of each adverse
attorney-client ruling would unnecessarily delay resolution at the
district court level and unduly burden the courts of appeals.202
Instead, the Court cited alternative measures such as the ability of
appellate courts to "vacat[e] an adverse judgment and remand[] for a
new trial in which the protected material and its fruits are excluded
from evidence," and the reality that immediate review is already
available for more serious privilege issues such as "[s]ection 1292(b)
appeals, mandamus, and appeals from contempt citations."02 The
Court suggested that the decision to allow immediate appeals for
orders affecting attorney-client privilege issues should come through
the process of rulemaking because of "the opportunity for full airing
it provides.
20 4
These six cases focusing on access to lawyers and legal advice reveal
a troubling pattern, one in which Congress and the Court place or
allow limits on the ability of those most in need of legal
representation to receive complete advice, assuming they are even
able to obtain a lawyer. In only one of the six decisions-Hardt v.
Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company-did the result favorably
encourage access to lawyers, and it is limited to the unique structure
of the ERISA fee-shifting provision applicable in that case. A similar
pattern is seen in the remaining cases considered by the Court during
198. Id. at 605 (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 352-53 (2006)).
199. Id. at 606.
200. Id. (citations and internal punctuation omitted).
201. Id. at 608.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 606-08.
204. Id. at 609.
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the 2009 term as well, all of which touch on the consequences
of bad lawyering. A comparable denial of access to justice and legal
representation may occur when a lawyer introduces false testimony,
presents insufficient mitigating evidence, offers the wrong advice,
misses a necessary filing deadline, or fails to request a limiting
instruction.
B. Cases Addressing Harm Caused by Bad Lawyering
1. Prosecutors' civil liability for fabricating evidence and introducing it at
trial: McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, Iowa
McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, Iowa 2 05 could have fundamentally
altered the law on prosecutorial immunity. The Supreme Court
never had an opportunity to rule on the case, however, because the
parties reached a settlement soon after oral argument, and
requested dismissal. °5 Nevertheless, it is worth briefly exploring the
background of this case because the Court has demonstrated an
interest in resolving the issue presented and similar cases are likely to
207
reappear again in the future. It is also important to consider the
lawyering issues presented in this case because a sufficient number of
justices found the case cert-worthy and, absent the parties' self-
imposed dismissal by settlement, the Court was prepared to issue an
opinion on the merits.
The case dates back to 1978, when two black teenagers, Curtis
McGhee and Terry Harrington, were wrongfully convicted of
murdering a white, retired Council Bluffs police department captain
who was working as a night security guard.28 They were sentenced to
205. 547 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2008), appeal dismissed, 130 S. Ct. 1047 (2010).
206. Jessie Holland, Case Over Iowa Prosecutors' Conduct is Settled, AP NEWS, Jan. 4,
2010, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/-/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id=1612107874 ("A
multimillion-dollar settlement on Monday ended the Supreme Court's consideration
of a case that could have changed the legal protections that criminal prosecutors get
as they do their jobs. The high court agreed to dismiss the case after Terry
Harrington and Curtis W. McGhee Jr. agreed to a $12 million settlement with
Pottawattamie County, Iowa, and two of its former prosecutors.").
207. Indeed, the Court already has granted certiorari to one such case. See
Connick v. Thompson, 578 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. granted 130 S. Ct. 1880
(2010) (challenging $14 million verdict against district attorney's office for failure to
train lawyers about Brady-violations, a failure that led to the wrongful conviction and
death sentence of accused murder John Thompson); but see Lawrence Rosenthal,
Second Thoughts on Damages for Wrongful Convictions, 85 CHI. KENT L. REv. 127, 127-28
(2010) (dismissing the idea that defendants who were wrongfully convicted due to
prosecutorial misconduct should be able to pursue monetary damages against the
prosecutors, and arguing instead that the justice system should continue to rely on
.political accountability" as the best deterrent against prosecutorial misconduct).
208. McGhee, 547 F.3d at 925; see also infra note 219.
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life imprisonment.209 In 2002, the Iowa Supreme Court found that
the prosecutors coerced false testimony and failed to disclose
evidence of an alternative suspect.2 '0 The court reversed Harrington's
conviction, and McGhee entered a plea of second degree murder in
exchange for a sentence of time served.1
The two men then brought civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against Pottawattamie County, Iowa, and the two former county
prosecutors, Joseph Hrvol and David Richter, alleging that they
fabricated witness testimony, which they later used at trial, and
withheld evidence by failing to disclose the existence of a key
suspect.212 The prosecutors argued that they were entitled to absolute
immunity under Imbler v. Pachtman,1 s in which the Supreme Court
held that prosecutors are afforded absolute immunity at trial for their
prosecutorial acts, but only qualified immunity for investigatory or
administrative acts. 214 The Court did not provide definitive guidance,
however, as to what differentiates a prosecutorial activity from an
investigatory or administrative activity.
21 5
The district court dismissed the claims against the prosecutors
based on the withholding of exculpatory evidence, but denied
immunity for the claims based on the allegations that the prosecutors
coerced false testimony from witnesses and later introduced it at
• • 216
trial to obtain the convictions. The Eighth Circuit affirmed,
holding that the prosecutors' procurement of false testimony violated
McGhee's and Harrington's right to substantive due process, and that
the prosecutors were not entitled to immunity after they fabricated
evidence and introduced it at trial.27 As McGhee and Harrington
observed, "[w] ithout the fabricated testimony, there was no evidence
connecting [the] plaintiffs to the murder.,
218
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
214. See id. at 430 (recognizing that when a prosecutor is performing an
investigative or administrative role, the prosecutor is only entitled to "a good-faith
defense comparable to [a] policeman's").
215. See id. at 430-31 (clarifying that the Court's holding is limited to
prosecutorial immunity under a § 1983 civil suit for damages).
216. See McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, Iowa, 475 F. Supp. 2d 862, 927-28 (S.D.
Iowa 2007) (ordering in addition that Harrington's and McGhee's state claims,
including intentional infliction of emotional distress and malicious prosecution, be
dismissed to the extent they derived from "withholding of exculpatory evidence," but
not dismissed to the extent they derived from "arrest without probable cause and
fabrication/coercion of evidence"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 547 F.3d 922 (8th
Cir. 2008), appeal dismissed, 130 S. Ct. 1047 (2010).
217. McGhee, 547 F.3d at 932-33.
218. Brief in Opposition for Respondent Curtis W. McGhee, Jr. at 6, McGhee, 130
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The former prosecutors petitioned the Supreme Court solely to
address the question of whether they could be tried civilly and owe
damages for wrongful conviction and incarceration for violating the
defendants' substantive due process rights by soliciting false
testimony and introducing it at trial.2 1 9  Though the former
prosecutors were careful to note that they had not conceded McGhee
and Harrington's version of the facts, 2 20 they did not dispute them in
the appeal; rather, they made two arguments. First, they contended
that the Eighth Circuit's decision stands in conflict with the Seventh
Circuit's holding in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,22' that the procurement of
false testimony does not violate the Constitution and that the
prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for the use of such
false testimony.22  Second, they suggested that the Eighth Circuit's
decision also conflicted with other Supreme Court precedent,
particularly related to the Court's "function test" for prosecutorial
immunity. 223 In sum, the two prosecutors made the case that they
should enjoy absolute immunity from plaintiffs' claims because the
claims "go to the heart of a prosecutor's function as an advocate for
the state in judicial proceedings."
24
In opposing the appeal, Harrington and McGhee both disputed
the claim of a circuit split and distinguished Buckley on the grounds
that it involved a different situation-there, one group of prosecutors
coerced false testimony while another used that testimony at trial.2 5
S. Ct. 1047 (No. 08-1065) [hereinafter McGhee Opposition Brief]; accord Brief in
Opposition for Respondent TerryJ. Harrington at 10, McGhee, 130 S. Ct. 1047 (No.
08-1065) [hereinafter Harrington Opposition Brief].
219. Brief for the Petitioners at i, McGhee, 130 S. Ct. 1047 (No. 08-1065). McGhee
and Harrington in their opposition briefs suggest that petitioners' motivation was
"[r]acial prejudice against [them] as African-Americans" and that petitioners
"framed" them because they "wanted a conviction" and "they knew a white Council
Bluffs jury would readily convict two black teenagers from across the Missouri River
in Omaha, Nebraska for the killing of a white Council Bluffs, Iowa police officer.
Indeed, they preferred framing two innocent black teenagers to conducting a proper
investigation of white suspects .... McGhee Opposition Brief, supra note 218,
at 5-6.
220. See Reply to Briefs in Opposition at 11, McGhee, 130 S. Ct. 1047 (No. 08-1065)
("Petitioners consistently have maintained that even if the alleged facts were true,
respondents' claims must fail because petitioners are immune as a matter of law.").
221. 20 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1994).
222. Id. at 795; see also Reply to Briefs in Opposition, supra note 220, at 2-3
(arguing that although Respondents attempted to trivialize the Seventh Circuit's
holding in Buckley as "illusory" and "an isolated aberration," some circuits have since
directly applied the holding or applied a similar test).
223. See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 219, at 7-8, 34-36 (discussing cases
that apply the function test, under which "a prosecutor is absolutely immune for acts
that are 'intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process'"
(quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 270 (1993)).
224. Id. at 5.
225. McGhee Opposition Brief, supra note 218, at 16-17; Harrington Opposition
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Furthermore, both argued that the Eighth Circuit properly applied
the functional test in reaching prosecutors' actions taken outside the
advocatory functions (e.g. the procurement of false testimony and
the introduction of said testimony at trial) .226 McGhee also argued
that relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be available in cases like this
to deter prosecutorial misconduct, or prosecutors would fabricate
evidence in criminal investigations, knowing there is little chance that
punishment would result.
2 7
The amici curiae brief filed by the National Association of Assistant
United States Attorneys and the National District Attorneys
Association in support of the former prosecutors focused on the
practical implications of allowing the Eighth Circuit's decision to
stand and addressed McGhee's argument about deterrence.228 The
amici explained that allowing prosecutors to face litigation and
potential civil liability will "chill[] prosecutorial efforts that are
necessary to combat and deter crime. The increase in litigation will
impose precisely the burdens on prosecutors-in terms of both time
and money-that the doctrine of absolute immunity is intended to
preclude. 2 29 Further, the amici highlighted alternative punishments
and sanctions that are already available, such as federal and state
attorney disciplinary organizations and review boards,30 judicial
sanctions, job loss, and criminal sanctions.23 Notably absent from the
list of available sanctions, however, was a remedy that might, in some
way, go toward addressing the harm suffered by the wrongfully-
convicted. 2
Brief, supra note 218, at 12-14.
226. McGhee Opposition Brief, supra note 218, at 9-10; Harrington Opposition
Brief, supra note 218, at 12-13.
227. McGhee Opposition Brief, supra note 218, at 19.
228. See generally Brief of the National Association of Assistant United States
Attorneys and National District Attorneys Association as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Pottawattamie County, Iowa v. McGhee, 130 S. Ct. 1047 (2010) (No. 08-
1065).
229. Id. at 2.
230. See id. at 8-12 (discussing entities such as the Department of Justice's Office
of Professional Responsibility, which investigates episodes of prosecutorial
misconduct by Department attorneys including "allegations of improper coercion or
intimidation of witnesses," and state bar associations that have authority to discipline
both federal and state prosecutors within theirjurisdictions for such infractions).
231. See id. at 13-15 (explaining additional checks on prosecutorial misconduct
already in place such as the "adversarial system" that ensures a prosecutor's actions
are challenged at trial, and "reversal on appeal" because of the negative impact such
a ruling can have on a prosecutor's career).
232. Perhaps the multi-million dollar settlement that McGhee and Harrington
received in this case will do so, though the effectiveness of such a settlement as a
deterrent against similar future misconduct by prosecutors is unclear. See Rosenthal,
supra note 207, at 152-53 (arguing that damages liability is unlikely to deter
prosecutorial misconduct because most damages awards will be passed on to the
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In addition to considering the misconduct of prosecutors, the
Supreme Court also considered the bad lawyering of criminal defense
attorneys during the 2009 term, granting review to a record ten
ineffective assistance of counsel cases involving lawyering issues. In
several of the cases, the Court analyzed the constitutional sufficiency
of evidence offered during the sentencing or mitigation phase of a
capital murder trial, and in the other cases the Court evaluated the
consequences of a misguided closing argument, misadvice, a missed
deadline, and the lack of a limiting instruction.
2. Inexperience and insufficient mitigation evidence: Wood v. Allen
Wood v. Allen,2 one of ten decisions addressing the criminal
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel,
presented an issue certain to resonate with law students and newly
practicing lawyers, as well as with the more senior attorneys
who train and supervise them: the degree to which an attorney's
inexperience 35 plays a role in an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. More specifically, the question presented to the Court was
whether "the failure of a novice attorney with no criminal law
experience to pursue or present evidence of [the] defendant's
severely impaired mental functioning was a strategic decision,"
despite evidence in the record demonstrating otherwise.2 6
Affirming the Eleventh Circuit, a divided Supreme Court held that
the exclusion of this evidence from the mitigation phase of the
capital murder trial was, indeed, a strategic decision. Consequently,
the Court concluded that the habeas relief sought was not
public through indemnification).
233. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text. In the past decade, three merits
opinions in ineffective assistance of counsel cases involving lawyering issues are the
most that have occurred in any term. See Appendix.
234. 542 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2008), affd, 130 S. Ct. 841 (2010).
235. Both newly practicing lawyers and their supervising attorneys have
professional obligations regarding attorney inexperience. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 1 (2009) ("In determining whether a lawyer employs the
requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the
relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's general
experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field in question, the
preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it is feasible
to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established
competence in the field in question."); MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 5.1
(2009) (addressing "[r]esponsibilities of [p]artners, [m]anagers, and [s]upervisory
[1] awyers").
236. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Wood, 130 S. Ct. 841 (No. 08-9156).
237. Wood, 130 S. Ct. 841, 851 (2010). But see id. at 851-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing the decision to enter evidence of Wood's mental deficiency at trial
from the decision to enter the evidence at sentencing, and arguing that while not
entering the evidence at trial was a strategic decision, not entering that evidence at
sentencing was "the result of inattention and neglect").
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warranted. Notably, the Court paid little attention to the
inexperience of Wood's lawyer, despite the fact that the lawyer's
inexperience was emphasized heavily by Wood on appeal and by
Judge Barkett, writing in dissent to the Eleventh Circuit opinion.9
The case originated from a challenge to the death sentence for
capital murder given to the petitioner, Holly Wood, a black man with
an IQ below 70, who was represented during the penalty phase by
Kenneth Trotter, a novice lawyer without any experience in criminal
law.2 40 Though Wood had been assigned two additional trial counsel
with more experience, those attorneys delegated the sentencing
process to Trotter, and "[i]n effect, Trotter was left to sink or
swim.",2 4' In his petition brief, Wood argued that Trotter's efforts
were "woefully inadequate" and that "[d]espite [] clear evidence of
mental impairments, neither Trotter nor either of his co-counsel
pursued that evidence as a mitigating factor., 24 2 Wood claimed his
lawyers were ineffective in the sentencing phase for two reasons: first,
they "did not present to the jury evidence of Wood's borderline
intellectual functioning and special education classes," and second,
they "failed to adequately investigate those issues before deciding
against presenting mental health evidence."
243
The Eleventh Circuit considered a range of evidence to evaluate
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, including testimony from
each attorney, the mitigating evidence presented to the jury and
sentencing judge, and the additional evidence that Wood argued
should have been investigated and presented. 44  Applying the
Strickland v. Washington 24 test for ineffective assistance of counsel,
238. Wood, 130 S. Ct. at 845.
239. See id. at 850 (declining to address the question of "whether counsel's
judgment was reasonable" and instead focusing on "whether counsel made a
strategic decision"). But see Wood, 542 F.3d at 1292-94 (describing the preparation
for the penalty phase conducted by Trotter, the most inexperienced attorney of the
three that represented Wood in his criminal trial); id. at 1320 (Barkett,J., dissenting)
("Due to Trotter's inexperience, and to [the other attorneys'] lack of participation in
preparation for the penalty phase, no investigation of Wood's mental retardation was
conducted at all, and that alone is the reason it was never presented to the jury in
mitigation.").
240. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 236, at 3 (citation omitted).
241. Id.; see ALA. CODE § 13A-5-54 (LexisNexis 2005) (requiring that attorneys
appointed to capital murder cases have a minimum of five years experience in
criminal law). But see MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 2 (2009) ("A
lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal
problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can
be as competent as a practitioner with long experience.").
242. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 236, at 4.
243. Wood, 542 F.3d at 1289.
244. Id. at 1289-99.
245. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court established that to
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which requires a deficient performance by counsel and that the
deficiency prejudiced the defendant, a divided panel of the Eleventh
Circuit rejected Wood's argument.
246
In reaching its conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit observed that this
was "not a case where counsel failed to present any mitigation
evidence, 2 47 nor was "this a case where counsel failed to obtain any
mental evaluation or did not know about the mental condition in
issue."248 Rather, the challenge rested on "whether not telling the jury
about Wood's low intellectual functioning-shown clearly in [a
mental health expert's] pre-trial report-was ineffective assistance.
Given the "highly deferential review of counsel's performance"
250
required by Strickland and other precedent, the Eleventh Circuit
sided with the other state courts reviewing the matter (but not the
federal district court)21 and concluded that this decision did not
constitute deficient performance. 25 2 As to Wood's argument that his
counsel did not conduct a thorough investigation, the court again
applied Strickland to find that the duty "'to make reasonable
,,,21325investigations '  was satisfied. 54  Untroubled by Trotter's lack of
experience, the majority instead focused on the fact that two other
experienced attorneys also had been involved in the case.255
Writing in dissent, however, Judge Barkett was incredibly disturbed
by what she described as "egregious failures of Wood's defense
counsel to investigate and develop available mitigating evidence for
the penalty phase," the very kinds of failures that ineffective
find ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant must
prove that: (1) the quality of the counsel's representation failed to meet an
.objective standard of reasonableness" and (2) this caused the defendant prejudice.
Id. at 687-88, 691-92.
246. See Wood, 542 F.3d at 1303.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See Wood v. Allen, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1242, 1245 (M.D. Ala. 2006)
(holding that the evidence did not support the state court's finding that Trotter
made a "strategic decision" not to present evidence of Wood's mental retardation
and, accordingly, vacating Wood's death sentence), affd in part and rev'd in part,
542 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2008), affd, 130 S. Ct. 841 (2010).
252. See Wood, 542 F.3d at 1303-04 (holding that counsels' determination that
"calling [the mental health expert] would not be in Wood's best interest" was not
objectively unreasonable based on the facts).
253. Id. at 1307 (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003)).
254. See id. at 1308 n.28 (distinguishing from Wiggins because counsel in that case
failed to investigate defendant's mental condition altogether, while in Wood counsel
did investigate before deciding not to enter evidence of the defendant's mental
condition).
255. Id. at 1292.
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assistance of counsel claims are designed to prevent.""6 Devoting over
twenty pages exclusively to the issue of whether Trotter's
inexperience caused ineffective counsel, she observed that "[n]o
evidence of Wood's mental retardation was ever presented to the
jury" and dismissed the majority's finding that this was a strategic
decision as "nothing but pure speculation" that "ignore[d] specific
and direct evidence of ineffectiveness of counsel.,157 Instead, Judge
Barkett argued that the majority finding "resemble [d] more a post hoc
rationalization of counsels' conduct than an accurate description of
their deliberations prior to sentencing."
2 58
Examining Trotter's experience, Judge Barkett noted several
concerns. Trotter had been practicing law for less than six months
and conveyed his nervousness about handling the case, yet was given
primary responsibility for the penalty phase of the trial.259 This and
other evidence led Judge Barkett to find that Trotter's inexperience
and lack of assistance from the other two attorneys in preparing for
Wood's penalty phase caused Wood to be prejudiced due to
260ineffective assistance of counsel.
Wood relied heavily on arguments similar to Judge Barkett's
dissent in his petition to the Supreme Court.2 6 1  In opposing the
petition, Alabama's attorney general primarily looked to the rulings
of the Eleventh Circuit and the two state courts rejecting Wood's
claim that his counsel were ineffective. 62 Regarding the first prong of
Strickland, which requires a showing of deficient performance, the
attorney general cited the conclusions of one of the state court's
previous rulings on the case:
Wood's counsel made a reasonable judgment that another mental
evaluation was not necessary. Because every counsel is faced with a
zero-sum calculation on time, resources, and defenses to pursue at
256. Id. at 1315 (BarkettJ., dissenting).
257. Id. at 1314.
258. Id. at 1321 (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 526-27).
259. Id. at 1316; see id. at 1316-18 ("Trotter expressed his frustration at the lack of
supervision and guidance he was receiving in a letter to... the Southern Poverty Law
Center, stating, I have been stressed out over this case and don't have anyone with
whom to discuss the case, including the two other attorneys."') (emphasis omitted).
260. Id. at 1320, 1322.
261. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 236, at 19-23 ("The record
reflects that Counsel's failure to request an independent psychological evaluation at
that late date was not based on a weighing of the pros and cons for Wood, but solely
based on their conclusion 'that . . . they didn t think the Judge would grant a
continuance.'") (citation omitted).
262. Brief of Respondents in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
18, Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841 (2010) (No. 08-9156).
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trial ... counsel does not enjoy the benefit of unlimited time and
resources [to investigate every possible argument] .263
As for the prejudice prong, the attorney general maintained that
given "the brutal nature of his crime and the specific findings of the
court that sentenced him to death," Wood's counsel's decision not to
enter evidence of his mental retardation at the sentencing phase did
not prejudice him because it "would not have altered, diminished, or
undermined the [] aggravating circumstances. 2 64
A divided Supreme Court sided with the Eleventh Circuit.261 Justice
Sotomayor, writing for the 7-2 majority, explained:
Reviewing all of the evidence, we agree with the State that even if it
is debatable, it is not unreasonable to conclude that... counsel
made a strategic decision not to inquire further into the
information contained in the report about Wood's mental
deficiencies and not to present to the jury such information as
266
counsel already possessed about these deficiencies.
Justices Stevens and Kennedy disagreed. Justice Stevens, writing in
dissent, said that the only conclusion he could draw from the record
is that the decision not to introduce evidence of Wood's mental
impairment was due to neglect and lack of attention and that such a
decision runs counter to "[t]he lawyers' duty to conduct a thorough
investigation of possible mitigating evidence [that] is well established
by our cases."267 Furthermore, Justice Stevens declared that "[d] espite
the fact that Trotter had a meager five months of experience as a
lawyer when he was appointed to represent Wood.... even he knew
that further investigation into any mental or psychological deficits
was in order. ' '2"8 This case was not the Court's final word on adequate
mitigation evidence, however, during the 2009 term.
3. More on insufficient mitigation evidence: Wong v. Belmontes, Bobby
v. Van Hook, Porter v. McCollum, Jefferson v. Upton, and Sears v.
Upton
Wood was not the only opportunity for the Supreme Court to
consider the sufficiency of evidence offered during the sentencing
phase of a capital murder trial. The Court granted certiorari and
issued per curiam opinions without argument in five additional cases
263. Id. at 19-20 (quotation and punctuation marks omitted).
264. Id. at 29. As described in the brief: "Wood brutally murdered Ruby Gosha
while she was asleep in her bed in her mother's house and then callously bragged
about the crime to his cousin. . . ." Id.
265. Wood, 130 S. Ct. at 851.
266. Id. at 850-51.
267. Id. at 852-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
268. Id. at 854.
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that examined a criminal defense attorney's obligation to secure
mitigation evidence during sentencing.269 The Court reversed or
vacated the lower court decisions in all five cases. In Bobby v. Van
271Hook270 and Wong v. Belmontes, the Court reversed the Sixth and
Ninth Circuits' decisions that counsel's performance was deficient
272
and prejudicial in failing to offer sufficient evidence. However, in
Porter v. McColum, 27 3 the Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's
decision that counsel's failure to offer additional mitigating evidence
was not prejudicial.274 Similarly, in Jefferson v. Upton2 75 and Sears v.
276Upton, the Court vacated the decisions of the Eleventh Circuit and
the Supreme Court of Georgia, respectively, finding that both lower
courts failed to properly evaluate the sufficiency of mitigation
evidence. Read together, the opinions offer guidance for
determining when the Court believes a lawyer's failure to put on
additional mitigating evidence amounts to a constitutional violation.
The cases bear a number of striking similarities, and understanding
these similarities is critical to appreciating the significance of their
differences. All five cases involved particularly gruesome murders
that occurred in the early and mid-1980s (with the exception of one
that took place in the early-1990s) .277 All five defendants experienced
horrific physical and psychological abuse
278 or physical trauma2 79
269. Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13 (2009) (per curiam); Wong v. Belmontes,
130 S. Ct. 383 (2009) (per curiam); Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009)
(per curiam); Jefferson v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 2217 (2010) (per curiam); Sears v.
Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259 (2010) (per curiam).
270. 130 S. Ct. 13 (2009) (per curiam).
271. 130 S. Ct. 383 (2009) (per curiam).
272. See Bobby, 130 S. Ct. at 15-16 (describing the Sixth Circuit's disposition of the
case and rejecting the circuit court's theory of the case); Wong, 130 S. Ct. at 384
(rejecting the Ninth Circuit's analysis of prejudice).
273.130 S. Ct. 447 (2009) (per curiam).
274. Id. at 455-56.
275. 130 S. Ct. 2217(2010) (per curiam) (Scalia, J. dissenting, joined by
Thomas,J.).
276. 130 S. Ct. 3259, 3261 (2010) (per curiam) (Scalia, J. dissenting, joined by
Thomas, J.) (The Chief Justice and Justice Alito would deny the petition for
certiorari.).
277. See Bobby, 130 S. Ct. at 15 (detailing how Van Hook lured the victim into a
vulnerable position where he strangled and subsequently murdered him with a
kitchen knife before mutilating the body); Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 448 (recounting how
Porter threatened and repeatedly drove past the house of a former girlfriend before
subsequently shooting and killing her); Wong, 130 S. Ct. at 384 (describing how
Belmontes used a steel bar to fatally bludgeon his victim during the course of a
burglary); Jefferson v. Hall 570 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11h Cir. 2009) (reviewing the severe
beating of the victim with wooden sticks or clubs, and a log dropped on the victim's
head); Sears v. State, 514 S.E.2d 426, 430 (Ga. 1999) (explaining that victim was
kidnapped while leaving a supermarket, assaulted with brass knuckles, raped, and
killed by knife stabbing).
278. See Bobby, 130 S. Ct. at 18 ("Van Hook (whose parents were both 'heavy
drinkers') started drinking as a toddler, began 'barhopping' with his father at age 9,
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during childhood, evidence of which they sought to use during the
penalty phase of their murder trials but were prevented from doing
so. And, as mentioned above, the lower court decisions in all five
cases were reversed or vacated by the Supreme Court.
Of the three reversals, what separates Porter (where the Court said
the mitigating evidence was not sufficient) from Van Hook and
Belmontes (where the Court said the mitigating evidence was
sufficient) is the fact that Porter's attorney omitted entire categories
of evidence-most notably his honorable military service. 280 The only
mitigating evidence Porter's attorney offered was "inconsistent
testimony about Porter's behavior when intoxicated and testimony
that Porter had a good relationship with his son., 28' No evidence was
offered about Porter's childhood abuse, mental health, or,
significantly, his military history.18  The Court was especially
impressed by the honorable and heroic nature of Porter's military
service.283 So impressed, in fact, that the court considered Porter's
lawyer's omission of a "commanding officer's moving description [of]
his active participation in two major engagements during the Korean
War" amounted to a constitutional deprivation.284 Also relevant to the
Court was evidence of the trauma Porter sustained from his military
service, including "long-term substance abuse, and his impaired
mental health and mental capacity.,
285
drank and used drugs regularly with his father from age 11 forward[] ... watched
his father beat his mother weekly .... and was beaten himself at least once."); Porter,
130 S. Ct. at 449 ("Porter routinely witnessed his father beat his mother, one time so
severely that she had to go to the hospital and lost a child. Porter's father was violent
every weekend, and by his siblings' account, Porter was his father's favorite target.");
Wong, 130 S. Ct. at 387 ("A number of [] witnesses highlighted Belmontes' 'terrible'
childhood. They testified that his father was an alcoholic and extremely abusive.");
Sears, 130S. Ct. at 3262 ("His parents had a physically abusive relationship . . .he
suffered sexual abuse at the hands of an adolescent male cousin" and his parents
were "verbally abusive.., and disciplined Sears with age-inappropriate military-style
drills.").
279. See Jefferson, 130 S. Ct. at 2218 ("When Jefferson was a child, he suffered a
serious injury to his head. ... [His mother testified] that a car ran over the top of his
head when he was two years old" and left him with "permanent brain damage that
causes abnormal behavior over which he has no or substantially limited control.")
(internal punctuation and citations omitted).
280. See Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 449-50 (describing Porter's "heroic military service"
and the subsequent mental trauma it caused him).
281. Id. at 449 (highlighting counsel's failure to present any evidence related to
Porter's mental health).
282. Id.
283. See id. at 454 (describing Porter's military service as "heroic," and
sympathetically depicting his struggle to "regain normality" upon leaving military
service).
284. Id. at 448.
285. Id. at 449.
1543
HeinOnline -- 59 Am. U. L. Rev. 1543 2009-2010
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
In contrast, the attorneys for Van Hook and Belmontes both
presented some evidence regarding their clients' childhood abuse
and psychological trauma, but Van Hook and Belmontes each argued
that their attorneys should have presented further testimony from
additional witnesses.286 While the appellate courts were sympathetic,
the Supreme Court was not, finding that additional testimony would
be unlikely to alter the ultimate result. 87 Thus these cases reveal that
a constitutional concern may be raised when an entire category of
mitigation evidence goes unconsidered (i.e. Porter's military history),
but not when more evidence falling into the same category is omitted
(i.e. Van Hook's and Belmonte's additional evidence on childhood
abuse). The two vacated cases confirm this conclusion.
As for the two vacated cases, the Supreme Court determined that
the lower courts failed to properly apply the standards for finding
prejudice under Strickland v. Washington based upon insufficient
mitigation evidence (Sears) or to properly apply the standards for
holding an evidentiary hearing challenging the sufficiency of
mitigation evidence (Jefferson). In Sears, the Court held that the state
"court failed to apply the proper prejudice inquiry," observing that
"[w]e have never limited the prejudice inquiry under Strickland to
cases in which there was only little or no mitigation evidence
presented."288 Moreover, the Court clarified that "[w] e certainly have
never held that counsel's effort to present some mitigation evidence
should foreclose an inquiry into whether a facially deficient
mitigation investigation might have prejudiced the defendant."289
Thus the fact that some mitigation evidence was introduced
("evidence describing [Sears'] childhood as stable, loving, and
essentially without incident. .. [to show that] a death sentence...
would devastate the family") 290 does not foreclose a conclusion that
the defendant was prejudiced by a failure to introduce additional
286. Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 18-19 (2009) (per curiam); Wong v.
Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383, 384, 387 (2009) (per curiam).
287. Bobby, 130 S. Ct. at 19-20 ("But there comes a point at which evidence from
more distant relatives can reasonably le expected to be only cumulative, and the
search for it distractive from more important duties .... Neither the Court of
Appeals nor Van Hook has shown why the minor additional details the trial court did
not hear would have made any difference."); Wong, 130 S. Ct. at 391 ("It is hard to
imagine expert testimony and additional facts about Belmontes' difficult childhood
outweighing the facts of [the] murder .... [T]he notion that the result could have
been different if only [his attorney] had put on more than the nine witnesses he did,
or called expert witnesses to bolster his case, is fanciful.") (emphasis in original).
288. Sears, 130 S.Ct. 3259, 3266 (2010) (internal punctuation and citations
omitted).
289. Id. at 3266 (emphasis in original).
290. Id. at 3261.
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evidence of a different nature (evidence showing an abusive
childhood including "significant frontal lobe abnormalities... [and]
several serious head injuries he suffered as a child as well as drug and
alcohol abuse") .91 In Jefferson, the Court found that the Eleventh
Circuit erred in considering only one of the eight exceptions
applicable for determining "whether the state court's factual findings
[that investigation of Jefferson's childhood head trauma was
unnecessary for mitigation purposes] warrant a presumption of
correctness." 292 As in Sears, the Court vacated the decision below and
remanded the case back to the lower court for further
consideration.293
4. Disloyalty in the closing argument: Smith v. Spisak
Smith v. Spisak 94 introduced yet another claim of constitutionally
ineffective lawyering, this time based, in part, upon a lawyer's trial
strategy at closing argument.295 Defendant Spisak was convicted in
1983 of four murders at Cleveland State University.29 6 He pled not
guilty by reason of insanity, but admitted to the murders.97 During
the trial he showed no remorse and claimed to be a follower of Adolf
Hitler.298 Though a number of experts were prepared to testify about
Spisak's mental illness, they were excluded from supporting his
insanity claim.29
In the closing argument of the sentencing phase, Spisak's attorney
"repeatedly stress[ed] the brutality of the crimes and demean[ed]
[Spisak] .",° He described each murder in graphic detail, made little
mention of Spisak's mental illness as a mitigating factor, and
"rambl[ed] incoherently ... about integrity in the legal system. 0'0
The district court found the argument to be "an appropriate part of
291. Id. at 3262.
292. 130 S. Ct. at 2223.
293. Id. at 2221 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) which codifies the factors to be
considered for presumption of correctness to be applied to the state court factual
determinations in a federal habeas appeal).
294. 130 S. Ct. 676 (2010).
295. Id. at 680.
296. Spisak v. Mitchell, 465 F.3d 684, 688-90 (6th Cir. 2006), remanded, Hudson v.
Spisak, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007), rev'd, Smith v. Spisak, 130 S. Ct. 676, 680 (2010).
297. Id. at 688, 690.
298. See id. at 688 (detailing the court's competency proceedings and Spisak's
request for multiple psychiatric evaluations).
299. See e.g., id. at 691-703 (recounting Dr. Oscar Markey's diagnosis of Spisak's
mental state and subsequently approving of the lower court's exclusion of that
testimony because it failed to show that Spisak met the legal standard required for a
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity).
300. Id. at 704.
301. Id. at 705.
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trial counsel's strategy to confront the heinousness of the murders
,,3012before the prosecution had the opportunity to do so.
The Sixth Circuit disagreed. The court reasoned that "in pursuing
this course, [Spisak's attorney] abandoned the duty of loyalty owed to
[his client] ."3 Of particular concern to the court was the
attorney's failure to explain mental illness as a mitigating factor
and that the attorney's "hostility toward [Spisak] aligned [him]
with the prosecution against his own client. 0 04 Furthermore, the
court observed, "[m]uch of [Spisak's attorney's] argument during
the closing of mitigation could have been made by the prosecution,
and if it had, would likely have been grounds for a successful
prosecutorial misconduct claim. 30 5 The Sixth Circuit reversed the
district court's denial of habeas. 6
Ohio's attorney general argued on appeal to the Supreme Court
that Spisak's attorney's closing argument was "reasonable when
viewed from counsel's perspective at the time. '"3'  A group of
prominent trial advocacy law professors, who filed an amicus curiae
brief, took issue with this position.0 8 They explained that Spisak's
attorney's closing argument unconstitutionally prejudiced his case,
asserting that "a closing argument that magnifies and obsesses on
weaknesses, while discussing strengths in an indirect and at
times incomprehensible manner, is below any reasonable measure
of professional competence. ,3 0' "For this Court to determine
otherwise," they warned, "would teach generations of future lawyers
incorrect lessons about how to present a case, and would leave
clients.., without the reasonable assurance of actual assistance of
counsel to which the Sixth Amendment entitles them."310
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Breyer conceded that
Spisak's attorney delivered an ineffective closing argument but
"nevertheless [found] no 'reasonable probability' that a better
closing argument without these defects would have made a significant
302. Id.
303. Id. at 706.
304. Id. (comparing Spisak's representation to the representation in Rickman v.
Bell, 131 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1997), where defense counsel repeatedly disparaged his
client as part of a strategy to persuade the jury that the defendant's "sick" nature
warranted mitigation of his capital sentence).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 687-88, 703.
307. Brief of Petitioner at 36, Smith v. Spisak, 130 S. Ct. 676 (2010) (No. 08-724).
308. Brief of Stephen Lubet et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2,
Spisak, 130 S. Ct. 676 (No. 08-724).
309. Id. at 3.
310. Id.
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difference .,,3 Because Spisak admitted to the murders and shootings
and, among other things, testified that he was a follower of Adolf
Hitler and that he "had hoped to 'create terror"' targeting his victims
based on their race, the Court determined that an improved closing
argument would not have altered the result.3 12  Justice Stevens,
however, wrote separately in a concurring opinion to emphasize the
deplorable nature of the closing argument:
It is difficult to convey how thoroughly egregious counsel's
closing argument was without reproducing it in its entirety ....
Suffice it to say that the argument shares far more in common with
a prosecutor's closing than with a criminal defense attorney's.
Indeed, the argument was so outrageous that it would have rightly
subjected a prosecutor to charges of misconduct....
Spisak's crimes, and the seemingly unmitigated hatred
motivating their commission, were truly awful. But that does not
excuse a lawyer's duty to represent his client within the bounds of
prevailing professional norms. . . . In short, counsel's argument
grossly transgressed the bounds of what constitutionally competent
counsel would have done in a similar situation.3
The Court's decision in Spisak brings to light a disconcerting
breach in the system of lawyer regulation that is supposed to protect
clients from such "thoroughly egregious" behavior by lawyers. While
the outcome might not have been different for Spisak, his attorney
nonetheless remained bound to the requirements of professional
conduct. Yet it appears no discipline or other follow up occurred
before the Ohio Office of Disciplinary Counsel or Grievance
Committee.1 4
5. Misadvice: Padilla v. Kentucky
In Padilla v. Kentucky3 1 1 a legal permanent resident brought an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim after his attorney incorrectly
311. Smith, 130 S. Ct. at 685.
312. Id. at 686-87.
313. Id. at 691-93.
314. See Renee Newman Knake, Study of Disciplinary Action in U.S. Supreme
Court Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Prosecutorial Misconduct Cases
(unpublished study, on file with author). For another theory on the strategy
employed by Spisak's attorney, see Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Bad
Lawyer Blog, http://badlawyemyc.blogspot.com/2009/10/ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel.html#comments (Oct. 14, 2009) (suggesting that Spisak's attorney, Tom
Shaughnessy, wanted to "save Frank Spisak's life-and, that Shaughnessy
'ineffectively' knew precisely what he was doing" in making such a prejudicial closing
argument).
315. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482 (Ky. 2008), rev'd and remanded
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
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advised him that pleading guilty to three drug-related charges would
not result in deportation.3 6  The case raised two closely related
questions regarding the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel: first, whether an attorney has an affirmative
duty to advise a non-citizen client that pleading guilty to an offense
will result in deportation (or is this a "collateral consequence" that
would relieve the attorney of such a duty?); and second, if the
deportation is in fact a collateral consequence, does an attorney's
misadvice that a guilty plea will not result in deportation constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel?
3 1 7
A brief history of this case clarifies the questions presented. The
petitioner, Jose Padilla, had lived in the United States for over forty
years (and served in the U.S. military during the Vietnam War) when
he was indicted in 2001 on three drug counts related to the
trafficking and possession of marijuana and for failing to have an
appropriate tax number on the truck he was driving.1 8 Padilla
conferred with his attorney about how to respond to the charges,
asking specifically about the consequences of a guilty plea.3 9 After his
attorney reassured him "that he 'did not have to worry about
immigration status since he had been in the country so long,' 320
Padilla pled guilty to the drug charges and the other charge was
dropped.321
But the advice from Padilla's attorney was wrong. Two federal
statutes related to antiterrorism and illegal immigration reform
enacted in 1996 made Padilla's felony an "aggravated felony" under
the Immigration and Nationalization Act, with deportation
mandatory following a guilty plea to such a charge.322 Accordingly,
Padilla sought post-conviction relief arguing that his attorney's wrong
advice about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.323
A divided Kentucky Supreme Court rejected Padilla's request for
relief based upon his attorney's misadvice, holding that mandatory
316. Id. at 1478.
317. Brief of Petitioner at i, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651) [hereinafter
Padilla Petitioner Brief].
318. 253 S.W.3d at 483.
319. See id. (indicating that Padilla's counsel had discussed the possibility of
deportation with Padilla, and that Padilla's counsel had given him a direct answer).
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. See Padilla Petitioner Brief, supra note 317, at 5-7 (citing AEDPA, Pub. L. No.
104-132 § 440(d), 110 Stat. 1214, 1276-77 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S.C.), and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility
Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) (1996)).
323. See Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483.
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deportation is a "collateral consequence[] ... outside the scope of
the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.3 24  The
court grounded its decision in the precedent of Commonwealth v.Fu ,325
Fartaao, where it previously held that attorneys have no duty to
advise their client about the possible deportation consequences of a
guilty plea.326
The two dissenting justices, however, argued that Fuartado was
"distinguishable in a small, but critical way."327  Specifically, they
noted that although an attorney may not have an "affirmative duty to
inform his or her client of the impact that a guilty plea will have on
civil immigration status," Padilla's situation was different in that
he explicitly asked his counsel about that very issue and was given
"terribly wrong advice."028  The dissent went on to explain that
" [c] ounsel who gives erroneous advice to a client which influences a
felony conviction is worse than no lawyer at all. Common sense
dictates that such deficient lawyering goes to effectiveness. 32 9 The
dissent concluded that, at a minimum, Padilla "was at least entitled to
a hearing" on the matter.330
Other courts considering similar types of cases involving attorney
advice on collateral consequences of a guilty plea apply a variety of
approaches in determining what amounts to ineffective assistance.
3 3
'
Padilla's petition to the Supreme Court classified the approaches into
four categories: (1) finding ineffective assistance only if an attorney
volunteers wrong advice; (2) allowing an attorney to refuse to answer
a question but finding ineffective assistance if wrong advice is given;
(3) affirmatively requiring attorneys to advise clients of immigration
consequences of guilty pleas (like deportation); and (4) the
approach of Kentucky courts finding that misadvice on collateral
consequences is never grounds for setting aside a plea.332 Padilla
argued that Kentucky's approach was out of step with precedent of
the Supreme Court and the majority of lower courts that have
addressed this issue,333 as well as with the standards of the American
324. Id. at 485.
325. 170 S.W.3d 384 (Ky. 2005), abrogated by Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473
(2010).
326. See Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483 (citing Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384).
327. Id. at 485 (CunninghamJ., dissenting).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. See generally Padilla Petitioner Brief, supra note 317 at 54-58 (discussing
considerations and approaches taken by various state and federal courts).
332. See id. at 27, 54-58.
333. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10-15, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct.
1473 (2010) (No. 08-651) (noting a 27-3 split among the courts on the question of
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Bar Association and public defenders' organizations that require
counsel to investigate and advise clients about collateral
• • 334
consequences of conviction. Specifically, he looked to Strickland v.
Washington135 where the Supreme Court established the test for
finding ineffective assistance of counsel, contending that he could
not be bound to a plea that was substantially induced by his attorney's
mistaken advice regarding the deportation consequences of pleading
guilty.
336
In opposing the petition, the Commonwealth of Kentucky
essentially focused on Fuartado's treatment of collateral
consequences•.3 3  The key components of the argument were that the
Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a criminal defendant any right
to receive advice from counsel regarding the collateral consequences
of a guilty plea and, accordingly, it necessarily follows that since
deportation is a collateral consequence, the failure to advise is
indistinguishable from misadvice While indicating that an
attorney's ethical obligations might be implicated by the misadvice,
the Commonwealth asserted that Sixth Amendment protections do
not extend to issues "wholly collateral to the criminal prosecution."3
9
The Supreme Court reversed, 340 and instead provided for "an
extraordinary expansion of the Sixth Amendment rights of criminal
defendants. 3 4' In a 7-2 decision, the Court found that the failure to
whether counsel have no Sixth Amendment duty to advise immigration defendants
of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea and a 17-2 split on the question of
whether, considering deportation as a collateral consequence, misadvice nonetheless
violates the Sixth Amendment, with only Kentucky and the D.C. Circuit holding that
it does not).
334. See Padilla Petitioner Brief, supra note 317, at 15-16 (asserting that basic
representation and advice of counsel must consider any dire risks or consequences
that result from legal action).
335. For a discussion of Stricklands two-prong ineffective assistance of counsel test,
see supra note 245, and accompanying text.
336. See Padilla Petitioner Brief, supra note 317, at 14-17 (arguing that the
immigration consequences of conviction can sometimes be a greater risk for a
defendant than criminal conviction itself, and asserting that defendants, not
attorneys, should define the objectives and scope of representation).
337. See generally Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 5-6, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473
(No. 08-651) (minimizing the connection between a criminal guilty plea and
potential deportation, and, further arguing that the central justification for the Sixth
Amendment right to adequate counsel is to ensure fairness in the establishment of
guilt or innocence).
338. See id. at 6-7, 16.
339. Id. at 17.
340. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480 (alluding to recent changes in immigration law
as justification for finding that immigration consequences are integral to criminal
proceedings).
341. Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Colgate Love, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Right to
Counsel and the Collateral Consequences of Conviction 1, (Ariz. Legal Studies, Discussion
Paper No. 10-16, 2010), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1591264.
1550 [Vol. 59:1499
HeinOnline -- 59 Am. U. L. Rev. 1550 2009-2010
2010] INCREASED ATTENTION TO THE LAW OF LAWYERING
warn Padilla about his deportation constituted ineffective assistance
of counsel. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, observed that
"[d]eportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because
of its close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to
classify as either a direct or collateral consequence. 42 As such, the
Court applied Strickland and held that a lawyer is constitutionally
required to advise a client about the deportation consequences of a
guilty plea.33 The Court declined to decide the prejudice prong of
Strickland, however, because the question was not properly before the
Court.
344
Applying the first prong of Strickland-"whether counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness"-
Justice Stevens explained that this inquiry "is necessarily linked to the
practice and expectations of the legal community" or "prevailing
professional norms., 345 In this case, the majority determined that the
"weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that
counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation. 346
Thus, as in some of the mitigation evidence cases, Padilla's outcome
stands in contrast to the other bad lawyering cases because it was
resolved favorably for the defendant. Another ineffective assistance
of counsel case to do so was Holland v. Florida.
6. Missing a criticalfiling deadline: Holland v. Florida
Holland v. Florida 47 involved a death row petitioner's late-filed
federal habeas appeal.3 48  Defendant Holland repeatedly contacted
his court-appointed attorney about the filing of his habeas petition,
both by letter and telephone.m49 But his attorney missed the filing
date.°
Holland then proceeded pro se, filing the petition on his own and
requesting "equitable tolling," or an extension, of the deadline based
upon his attorney's "gross negligence."3 51 The statute of limitations to
342. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.
343. See id. (relying on professional norms to require advice on immigration
consequences of criminal proceedings).
344. Id. at 1487.
345. Id. at 1482 (citation omitted).
346. Id.
347. Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), rev'd and
remanded, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554 (2010).
348. Id. at 1336.
349. See id. at 1337 (detailing Holland's attempts to contact his attorney and his
attorney's failure to even inform Holland that his petition for a writ of habeas corpus
had been denied).
350. Id. at 1336.
351. Id.; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Holland v. Florida, No. 09-5327
1551
HeinOnline -- 59 Am. U. L. Rev. 1551 2009-2010
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
file a federal habeas corpus petition provides for equitable tolling
when two standards are met: first, the petitioner must show "that he
has been pursuing his rights diligently, and [second,] that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely
filing."352
According to the Eleventh Circuit, "[p]ure professional negligence
is not enough" to satisfy this test.3 5 3 While the court agreed that the
attorney's "failure to file a [timely] federal habeas petition [], despite
[Holland's] repeated instructions to do so 354 constituted gross
negligence, it determined that "no allegation of lawyer negligence or
of failure to meet a lawyer's standard of care ... can rise to the level
of egregious attorney misconduct that would entitle [Holland] to
equitable tolling."355 In other words, "even attorney conduct that is
grossly negligent can never warrant tolling absent bad faith,
dishonesty, divided loyalty, mental impairment or so forth on the
lawyer's part.
3
1
6
In his Supreme Court appeal, Holland took issue with
"[t]he Eleventh Circuit's stubborn refusal to acknowledge that
'gross negligence' is sufficient to warrant equitable tolling."357  He
contended that the Eleventh Circuit's test conflicts with other circuits
and establishes a "near-impossible standard to meet. 3 58  In the
opposition brief, Florida's attorney general suggested that Holland's
own behavior, including not answering "at least eight letters" written
by his attorney, should be taken into account, and further argued
that equitable tolling is not warranted in this case because Holland's
attorney's "miscalculat[ion of] the federal habeas deadline ... was
merely ordinary attorney negligence.,
359
A majority of the Supreme Court agreed with Holland that
equitable tolling applied to the federal habeas deadline, and rejected
the Eleventh Circuit's "rigid" standard for finding the "extraordinary
circumstances" warranting tolling.360 The Court left the question of
(U.S. May 13, 2009) [hereinafter Holland Petition] (seeking certiorari to determine
whether late filing of a habeas appeal due to gross negligence of counsel warrants
equitable tolling).
352. Holland, 539 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079,
1085 (2007)).
353. Id. at 1339.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Holland Petition, supra note 351, at 7.
358. Id. at 7-8.
359. Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 13, Holland v. Florida, No. 09-5327
(U.S. Sept. 11, 2009).
360. Holland v. Florida 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2563 (2010) ("[W]e hold that [the
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whether tolling should apply in this particular case, however, to the
lower court.36' Justice Breyer writing for the majority suggested that
the facts of this case "may well be an extraordinary instance" where
tolling is appropriate:
[Attorney] Collins failed to file Holland's federal petition on time
despite Holland's many letters that repeatedly emphasized the
importance of his doing so. Collins apparently did not do the
research necessary to find out the proper filing date, despite
Holland's letters that went so far as to identify the applicable legal
rules. Collins failed to inform Holland in a timely manner about
the crucial fact that the Florida Supreme Court had decided his
case, again despite Holland's many pleas for that information. And
Collins failed to communicate with his client over a period of years,
despite various pleas from Holland that Collins respond to his
letters.362
Like many of the lawyering cases before the Court this term,
Holland implicates important duties owed by a lawyer to the
client. For example, the ABA Model Rules demand minimum
levels of competence, diligence, and communication. A lawyer also
is required under the Model Rules to "abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation" and must "consult with
the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. 3 64 While
a violation of these duties alone does not necessarily rise to the level
of a constitutional violation, the compounded violation of multiple
professional conduct duties as in cases like Holland must be taken
into account, a point acknowledged by the Court's majority
opinion.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 28 U.S.C.] § 2244(d) is subject
to equitable tolling in appropriate cases." Id. at 2560.). Justice Breyer authored the
7-2 opinion, with Justice Scalia authoring a dissent joined by Justice Thomas.
361. See id. at 2565 ("Thus, because we conclude that the District Court's
determination must be set aside, we leave it to the Court of Appeals to determine
whether the facts in this record entitle Holland to equitable tolling, or whether
further proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing, might indicate that
respondent should prevail.").
362. Id. at 2564.
363. See, e.g., MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2009) (addressing duty of
competence); MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2009) ("A lawyer shall act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."); MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CoNDUcT R. 1.4(a) (3),(4) (2009) ("A lawyer shall . . . keep the client
reasonably informed about the status of the matter; [and] promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information . ).
364. MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2009).
365. See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564-65 (citing Brief of Legal Ethics Professors and
Practitioners et. al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner); see also Brief of Legal
Ethics Professors and Practitioners et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
12, Holland v. Florida, No. 09-5327 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2009) (discussing the fiduciary
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7. Failure to request a limiting instruction: Berghuis v. Thompkins
Berghuis v. Thompkins3 6 is best-known for holding that a criminal
suspect waives his right to remain silent if he does not affirmatively
invoke the right.6 7 But the case also touched on a lawyering issue-
whether the defense attorney's failure to request a limiting
instruction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Van Chester
Thompkins was convicted of murder and related offenses for the
drive-by shooting-death of a man outside a mall located in suburban
Detroit, Michigan, and injuries to another victim. 3"8 According to
"the prosecution's theory.... Thompkins shot the victims from the
passenger seat of a van driven by Eric Purifoy. . . The defense
strategy was to pin the blame on Purifoy.
3
6
9
During trial, the prosecution established that Purifoy had been
previously tried and acquitted on murder and assault charges
brought under an aiding-and-abetting theory since he was thed• 370
driver. In his testimony, Purifoy explained that "he had been
driving the van and that Thompkins was in the passenger seat while
another man, [named] Myzell Woodward, was in the back."37' Purifoy
then went on to testify that "he did not see who fired the weapon
because the van was stopped and he was bending over near the floor
when shots were fired."
372
The prosecution believed Purifoy was lying. In an exchange of
letters between Purifoy and Thompkins that occurred after Purifoy's
trial but before Thompkins's started, "one of Purifoy's letters
appeared to give Thompkins a trial strategy. The prosecution
suggested that this strategy was to say Woodward shot the victims,
allowing Purifoy and Thompkins to say they dropped to the floor
duties lawyers owe to their clients and how professional standards of conduct
underscore the gross nature of the attorney's negligence in Holland).
366. Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572, 590-91 (6th Cir. 2008), rev'd and
remanded, 130 S.Ct. 2250 (2010) (Sotomayor, J. dissenting, joined by Stevens,
Ginsburg, Breyer, J.J.).
367. Id. at 2264. The portion of the Court's opinion discussing the waiver of
Miranda rights received extensive media coverage shortly after the decision was
rendered. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Mere Silence Doesn't Invoke Miranda, Justices Say, N. Y.
TIMES,June 1, 2010 at A15; Jess Bravin, Justices Narrow Miranda Rule, WALL ST.J.,June
2, 2010 at A2; Robert Barnes, Supreme Court: Suspects must invoke right to remain silent in
interrogations, WASH. PosT, June 2, 2010 at A5.
368. See 130 S.Ct. at 2256-68.
369. Id. at 2257.
370. See id. at 2257 ("So that the Thompkins jury could assess Purifoy's credibility
and knowledge, the prosecution elicited testimony from Purifoy that he had been
tried earlier for the shooting under an aiding-and-abetting theory. Purifoy . . .
testified that ajury acquitted him of the murder and assault charges" but convicted
him of lesser charges like carrying a concealed weapon.).
371. Id. at 2275.
372. Id.
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when the shooting started. 3 73 Thus, during closing arguments, the
prosecution "suggested that Purifoy lied when he testified that he did
not see Thompkins shoot the victims.
374
Thompkins's attorney did not object to the prosecution's inference
that Purifoy lied, nor did he request "an instruction informing the
jury that it could consider evidence of the outcome of Purifoy's trial
only to assess Purifoy's credibility, not to establish Tompkins's
guilt. ' 375 Thompkins was sentenced to life in prison without parole
after the jury found him guilty on all charges. Though the federal
district court and state courts denied Thompkins's claim that his
attorney's failure to ask for a limiting instruction constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Circuit granted him relief.
According to the Sixth Circuit, "the failure to request such a
limiting instruction is particularly deficient in light of Thompkins's
primary defense at trial, which was that Eric Purifoy was the shooter
and that [Thompkins] was merely present. 3 7 6 The court also found
that Strickland's prejudice requirement was clearly established, given
that "in the absence of a limiting instruction, the jury could well have
believed that it was entirely proper to weigh Purifoy's acquittal as
significant evidence that Thompkins must have been the shooter."
377
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, observed:
It seems doubtful that failure to request the instruction about the
earlier acquittal or conviction was deficient representation; but on
the assumption that it was, on this record, Thompkins cannot show
prejudice. The record establishes that it was not reasonably likely
that the instruction would have made any difference in light of all
the other evidence of guilt.1
71
Even if the Sixth Circuit was correct that "the state court used an
incorrect legal standard" the majority held that Thompkins could not
satisfy Strickland's prejudice requirement.3
79
As demonstrated by the summary in Part I of this Article, each
of the 2009 cases raised on its own important law of
lawyering considerations, especially regarding access to legal advice
373. Id.
374. Id. at 2257. The prosecutor argued: "Did Eric Purifoy's Jury make the right
decision? I'm not here to judge that. You are not bound by what his Jury found.
Take his testimony for what it was, [a] twisted attempt to help not just an
acquaintance but his tight buddy." Id. at 2258.
375. Id. at 2258.
376. Thompkins v. Berghius, 547 F.3d 572, 590-91 (6th Cir. 2008).
377. Id. at 591.
378. 130 S.Ct. at 2265.
379. Id.
1555
HeinOnline -- 59 Am. U. L. Rev. 1555 2009-2010
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
and adequate legal representation. Equally critical, however, are
observations drawn from a collective reading of the cases. Part II
offers some preliminary thoughts.
II. SOMETHING MORE: DERIVING MEANING FROM THE SUPREME
COURT'S INCREASED ATTENTION TO THE LAW OF LAWYERING
The lawyering cases addressed by the Supreme Court during the
2009 term varied widely in substance, but contained common themes
about the law of lawyering as well as the rights and interests of those
who need legal representation and advice. All of the cases raised
important questions about the role of lawyers and the practice of law.
Accordingly, the cases should be considered in relation to one
another in order to understand and appreciate their implications for
the law of lawyering field.
While the full impact of these cases may be realized more fully with
the passage of time, this Article suggests three reasons why the
Court's heightened interest in the law of lawyering appears to be
more than mere coincidence. First, when read together, the cases
reveal a troubling pattern of limitations on access to legal advice
coupled with an inability to fully redress harms caused by bad
lawyering. Second, certain aspects of the cases offer helpful lessons
for those involved in future efforts to regulate the legal profession.
Third, if any question remains as to the importance of constitutional
considerations in the study and scholarship of lawyer ethics, the
Court's newest lawyering precedent puts the matter to rest. Each
observation is addressed in turn below.
A. Accessing Competent Legal Advice; Ameliorating Harmful Legal
Representation
The lawyering cases taken up by the Supreme Court during the
2009 term reveal a troubling pattern of limitations on access to legal
advice coupled with an inability to fully redress harms caused by bad
lawyering. One common thread running through every opinion is
the need for clients to access competent legal advice and
effective, rather than harmful, representation. For example, the
cases of Milavetz, Humanitarian Law Project, and Mohawk Industries
presented the Court with assorted dimensions of the attorney's
responsibility to competently advise a client, whether the attorney
faces constraints on advice from a federal statute or finds that
attorney-client privilege may not be adequately protected.3 80 These
380. See supra notes 2 and 5.
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cases reveal tension between an attorney's professional obligations
and regulations from external sources like federal laws.
The problem with statutes like those at issue in the Milavetz and
Humanitarian Law Project cases is that, as the Supreme Court
explained in a similar context, "[r] estricting ... attorneys in advising
their clients and in presenting arguments and analyses to the courts
distorts the legal system by altering the traditional role of
the attorneys. 38 1 In recognizing the importance of "an informed,
independent bar, 382 the Court further observed that "[w]e must be
vigilant when Congress imposes rules and conditions which in effect
insulate its own laws from legitimate judicial challenge."83 The advice
and advocacy bans in Milavetz and Humanitarian Law Project run the
risk of doing precisely that-they insulate aspects of Congress's
bankruptcy and anti-terrorism laws from legal challenge by
preventing lawyers from advising clients completely about the
application and meaning of those laws. Even under the narrowed
construction required by the Court's holding in Milavetz, permitting
the ban to stand means that certain advice may remain off-limits for
384lawyers and their clients. In some instances, these laws deter
lawyers from offering any legal services that might be implicated by
the bans.385  Moreover, although the Court upheld the ban in
Humanitarian Law Project only as applied to the plaintiffs under
narrow circumstances, going forward the holding is likely to have a
significant chilling effect on legal advice to clients designated as
foreign terrorist organizations.388 And, while Mohawk Industries did
not challenge a federal statute, similar concerns were at stake, as
Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged during oral argument when he
reflected that preservation of attorney-client privilege-a protection
381. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 544 (2001).
382. Id. at 545; see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321-322 (1981)
(holding that a public defender does not act "under color of state law" because the
public defender "works under canons of professional responsibility that mandate his
exercise of independent judgment on behalf of the client" and because there is an
"assumption that counsel will be free of state control").
383. Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. at 548.
384. See, e.g., Wash Park Prophet: Alas, Narrowed Bankruptcy Gag Rule Lives,
http://washparkprophet.blogspot.com/2010/03/narrowed-bankruptcy-gag-rule-
lives.html (Mar. 8, 2010, 12:29 EST) (listing concerns for attorneys offering
bankruptcy advice in the wake of Milavetz, such as the continued inability to offer full
advice and the potential breach of attorney-client privilege should it become
necessary to determine whether an attorney has violated the statute).
385. Some bankruptcy attorneys, for example, avoid any consumer work because
of the restrictions under BAPCPA. See Email with Peter J. Roberts, Partner, Shaw
Gussis Fishman Glantz Wolfson & Towbin (July 22, 2010) (on file with author).
386. See discussion supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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necessary to facilitate candid legal advice-is "central to maintaining
the rule of law."""
Thus, Mohawk Industries also strikes at the essence of the same
concerns about an attorney's ability to advise a client as those
featured in Milavetz and Humanitarian Law Project. As the Supreme
Court has long recognized, the rationale for the attorney-client
privilege--"the oldest of the privileges for confidential
communications known to the common law"-"is to encourage full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law
and administration of justice., 38 1 Without that full and frank
communication, an attorney may not be able to offer essential advice.
Similarly, if the possibility of an immediate appeal to protect that
privilege does not exist, clients "may be less likely to engage in
internal investigations to ensure their compliance with the law
because the assurance that the legal findings and conclusions
resulting from such investigations could be maintained in confidence
would be weakened considerably. '"3 9 Though the Court ultimately
was not persuaded by this argument, the case brings to light a
problematic limitation on access to legal advice.
For many in need of access to legal advice, however, the
predicament is not whether an attorney can offer complete and
candid guidance, but whether an attorney is available at all. While in
recent years Congress has demonstrated a willingness to limit the
nature of attorneys' advice, as seen in Milavetz and Humanitarian Law
Project,390 in comparison, Congress has expanded access by
encouraging attorneys to take on meritorious cases through fee-
shifting statutes.39' The Court, however, as explained in Part I of this
Article, has been less than eager to do so. The outcomes of Astrue,
Hardt, and Perdue present a bit of a mixed bag but ultimately do more
to undermine than support the effectiveness of fee-shifting statutes in
facilitating and encouraging access to lawyers and legal advice. Astrue
leaves fee-shifting awards subject to offset; Perdue makes it less likely
that fee-shifting awards will be enhanced. These constraints on fee-
shifting statues are especially alarming given the decline in
affordable, accessible legal representation caused by the economic
387. Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter,
130 S. Ct. 599 (2009) (No. 08-678).
388. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
389. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 188, at 29.
390. For further discussion about Congress's efforts in this regard, see infra notes
402-411 and accompanying text.
391. See, e.g., supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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downturn of the past few years. The chief state court justices for
California and New York recently editorialized:
As the economy has worsened, the ranks of the self-represented
poor have expanded. In a recent informal study conducted by the
Self-Represented Litigation Network, about half the judges who
responded reported a greater number of pro se litigants as a result
of the economic crisis. Unrepresented litigants now also include
many in the middle class and small-business owners who
unexpectedly find themselves in distress and without sufficient
resources to pay for the legal assistance they need.39
In many cases, these are precisely the individuals that federal fee-
shifting statutes are designed to assist. For example, the Equal Access
to Justice Act (the statute at issue in Astrue) "was enacted to improve
access to the courts for small business and individuals by paying their
attorney's fees when the Government has acted unreasonably. 3 93 But
the Court has repeatedly undermined, rather than supported,
congressional policy in this area.3 9 4
In addition to raising concerns about how Congress and the
Supreme Court limit access to lawyers, a number of the cases
reviewed in this Article reveal harms that can be caused by
inadequate lawyering. The ten ineffective assistance of counsel cases
taken up by the Court expose a gap in attorney regulation. In some
cases the lawyering is so bad that it would constitute misconduct for
the opposing counsel (let alone the client's own attorney) ,s9 but it
goes unaddressed because the bad lawyering does not rise to the
396level of a constitutional violation. In theory the attorney discipline
systems administered independently by all states should kick in,3 97 but
these cases suggest that this does not always occur.39 8 This pattern of
392. John T. Broderick, Jr. & Ronald M. George, A Nation of Do-It-Yourself Lawyers,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2010, at A21; see also Gillian Hadfield, Making Legal Aid More
Accessible and Affordable, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2010, at A17 ("[A]mericans have a
much higher rate of simply giving up in the face of legal difficulties, with effectively
nowhere to turn if they cannot afford a lawyer who comes at a minimum price of
$150 an hour.").
393. Brief of Amici Curiae National Organization of Social Security Claimants'
Representatives et al. at 11, Astrue v. Ratliff, No. 08-1322 (U.S.Jan. 15, 2010).
394. See, e.g., supra notes 94-108 and accompanying text.
395. See, e.g., supra notes 313-14 and accompanying text.
396. For a thorough and compelling discussion of the deficiencies in America's
criminal justice system, see AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: How AMERICA HOLDS
COURT (Metropolitan Books) (2009).
397. As justice Blackmun observed, concurring in the judgment in Jones v. Barnes,
463 U.S. 745, 755 (1983), an attorney's behavior may very well violate ethical
standards but not constitute a constitutional violation.
398. See Renee Newman Knake, Study of Disciplinary Action in U.S. Supreme
Court Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Prosecutorial Misconduct Cases
(unpublished study, on file with author). Several of these cases evidence
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limitations on access to legal advice and harms caused by bad
lawyering is concerning. Nevertheless it appears that the Court, for
the most part, is willing to let the pattern continue, at least with
respect to limits on access to legal advice (where the Court upheld
five of the six limits at issue in the 2009 cases),'99 though certainly less
so in the bad lawyering matters (where the Court ruled at least
somewhat favorably for the criminal defendants in five of the ten
ineffective assistance of counsel cases) .400
B. Lessons for Future Regulation of the Legal Profession
A second observation to be drawn from these cases lies in the
lessons offered for those involved in future regulation of the legal
profession. A number of the cases illustrate the consequences borne
of increasing external regulation and treatment of lawyers as
gatekeepers or service providers.4 1  Moreover, the Court's reference
to the role of the ABA in certain of the cases, whether ABA model
guidelines or amicus arguments, should be heeded in order for the
ABA and state bar organizations to remain relevant and effective in
upcoming efforts to regulate the profession.
1. Recognizing the consequences of increased federal regulation and the
classification of lawyers as gatekeepers or service providers
In recent years, scholars in the law of lawyering field have begun to
consider how the role of lawyers has evolved in light of increasing
external regulation (i.e., regulation beyond that administered by the
acquiescence by the Court (and the legal profession) to the reality that having a
lawyer may very well be one of the punishments inflicted upon those who find
themselves charged with a crime. See 463 U.S. at 764 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("In
many ways, having a lawyer becomes one of the many indignities visited upon
someone who has the ill fortune to run afoul of the criminal justice system.").
399. The only access decision that came down favorable to attorneys or clients in
terms of encouraging access to legal advice and lawyers was Hardt v. Reliance Standard
Life Insurance Co. See discussion supra notes 132 to 142 and accompanying text.
400. For example, consider the Padilla and Porter cases where the Court found that
the lawyer conduct at issue violated the Sixth Amendment. Interestingly, the Court
in both cases opened the opinions emphasizing the honorable military service by the
defendants. SeePadilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 (2010) ("Padilla served this
Nation with honor as a member of the U.S. Armed Forces during the Vietnam
War."); Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 448 (2009) ("Petitioner George Porter is
a veteran who was both wounded and decorated for his active participation in two
major engagements during the Korean War; his combat service unfortunately left
him a traumatized, changed man."). The Holland, Jefferson, and Sears cases are also
exceptions to this observation, though the ultimate outcome for the defendants
remains to be determined on remand. See supra notes 347-65 (Holland), 288-93
(Jefferson and Sears) and accompanying text.
401. The author is grateful for the suggestions from David Wilkins and Laurel
Terry to consider the 2009 cases from this perspective.
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state supreme courts based upon professional conduct rules
promulgated by the ABA). As ABA President Carolyn Lamm has
written:
Unfortunately, the present system of regulation of lawyers [by the
highest court of each state] is being eroded through multiple
changes enacted at the federal level, without the needed study,
thought and consensus and without central guiding principles. A
series of piecemeal federal laws and regulations threatens to
undermine state judicial branch regulation of lawyers and to erode
several of the cornerstones on which is built the client-lawyer
relationship that protects both clients and the public. 40'
The concept of internal regulation refers to professional conduct
rules drafted by the ABA for adoption and enforcement by state
courts. External regulation, in contrast, includes federal action, like
that cited by Lamm, and also efforts such as provisions like the
regulating of lawyers found in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act40 3 and the Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act passed by the House of
Representatives in December 2009 (though subsequently modified to
exclude lawyers, in large part due to efforts by the ABA). 404 The
402. Carolyn B. Lamm, Memo to Washington: Hands Off Lawyers, NAT'L L. J.,
Sept. 21, 2001, at 62.
403. For a discussion of the ways Congress controls lawyers under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, see Lewis D. Lowenfels et al., Attorneys as Gatekeepers: SEC Actions Against
Lawyers in the Age of Sarbanes-Oxley, 37 U. TOL. L. REv. 877, 878, 929 (2006) (observing
that "[t]he ushering in of what appears to be a new era of the SEC as an active and
enthusiastic proponent of the attorney's 'gatekeeping' role raises serious questions"
and citing evidence that "the sheer number of SEC actions against lawyers" in the
wake of the new regulation "has increased dramatically"). For an example of an
earlier federal statutory constraint on legal advice, see J. Matthew Miller, Note,
Balancing the Budget on the Backs of America's Elderly-Section 4734 of the Balanced Budget
Act: Criminalization of the Attorney's Role as Advisor and Counselor, 29 U. MEM. L. REV.
165, 197 (1998), arguing that section 4734 of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997
unconstitutionally prohibited attorneys from counseling elderly clients about legal
actions regarding Medicaid issues.
404. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) and ABA President Lamm
Statement re: "Exclusion for the Practice of Law" in "Dodd-Frank Act of 2010,"
http://www.abanow.org/2010/06/aba-president-lamm-statement-re-exclusion-for-
the-practice-of-law-in-dodd-frank-act-of-2010/ (June 26, 2010) (explaining that the
new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau established by the Dodd-Frank Act of
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 "may not exercise any
supervisory or enforcement authority with respect to an activity engaged in by an
attorney as part of the practice of law under the laws of a State in which the attorney
is licensed to practice law"). For a detailed history of the "evolving relationship
between the internal and external law" of lawyering, see Ted Schneyer,
An Interpretation of Recent Developments in the Regulation of Law Practice, 30 OKLA. CITY U.
L. REV. 559, 595-603, 608 (2005), detailing several developments and trends, such as:
a shift in the regulatory center of gravity toward Washington with a
corresponding shift from judicial to legislative and administrative
regulation; [] greater emphasis on regulation that makes lawyers
gatekeepers in order to protect public or third-party, rather than client,
interests; [] a growing tendency to place lawyers and members of other
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problem with these kinds of federal laws, as Lamm explains, is that
they "incorrectly identify lawyers and other professionals as
'creditors' or "'debt relief agencies' or "'providers of financial
products or services"' and consequently "interfere[] with the states'
rights to regulate lawyers and protect consumers of legal services.
''45
As a result of the expanding external regulation, lawyers are faced
with increasing duties. Two terms often ascribed to lawyers' new
duties are lawyers as "gatekeepers40 6 or "service providers., 40 7 One
concern about characterizing lawyers in these roles is that the
gatekeeper or service provider regulations can alter lawyers' ethical
functions in elemental ways.40 8 An example of this has been identified
by ProfessorJohn Leubsdorf: "where the bar's main focus has usually
been on the lawyer-client relationship and the adversary system, new
regulations often make lawyers gatekeepers charged to protect public
and governmental interests. '' 4" Similarly, Professor Laurel Terry has
explained that under
occupations that perform similar work in the same regulatory class; [and]
... a shift away from the primacy of the 'internal' law toward law that is
produced, interpreted, and enforced by 'external' regulators.
405. Lamm, supra note 402, at 62 (citations omitted).
406. See Schneyer, supra note 404, at 582-83 (citations omitted) ("All lawyers are
'gatekeepers' in the obvious sense that they may not knowingly assist clients in
unlawful conduct and some have long had modest duties to monitor their clients as
well. But the term has taken on a more specialized meaning since the 1980s. In this
usage, it refers to auditors and other professionals who are in a position to prevent
corporate misconduct or failures by monitoring their corporate clients or evaluating
a company's performance and withholding their approval or assistance when they
detect problems."). See also David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating
Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1164 (1993). Professor Wilkins was
among the first to identify what he calls the "'gatekeeper' strategy" for preventing a
client's misconduct in which "the lawyer can refuse to participate in the disputed
transaction or otherwise withhold support in a manner that makes it more difficult
for the client to accomplish its illicit purpose," drawing from Professor Reinier
Kraakman's definition of the term "gatekeeper liability as 'liability imposed on
private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation
from wrongdoers.'" Id. at 1164 n.80 (citing Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The
Anatomy ofa Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986)).
407. See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Impact
of Treating the Legal Profession as "Service Providers", 2008 J. PROF. LAw. 189, 189 (2008)
("In the past fifty years, one has heard debates about whether law is a business, a
profession, or both, what these terms mean and whether it matters. Regardless of
what one thinks about these debates, there is a new paradigm that must be added to
the mix, which is the paradigm of lawyers as 'service providers'.").
408. A complete discussion of lawyers' roles as gatekeepers or service providers is
beyond the scope of this Article and already has been well-covered by lawyer ethics
scholars elsewhere. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 404; Terry, supra note 407; Fred
Zacharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1387, 1389 (2004).
409. John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BuF. L. REv. 959, 971-72 (2009);
see alsoJames M. Fischer, External Control Over the American Bar, 19 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 59, 97 (2006) (discussing increased state and federal legislative control over
lawyers).
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the service providers paradigm, the legal profession is not viewed as a
separate, unique profession entitled to its own individual
regulations, but is included in a broader group of "service
providers," all of whom can be regulated together. In [her] view,
this new paradigm represents a fundamental, seismic shift in the
410
approach towards lawyer regulation.
Her research documents how the service providers classification
"already has affected some aspects of U.S. (and non-U.S.) lawyer
regulation" and she predicts that it "is likely to have profound
implications for the future."
4 11
While the questions of who should regulate lawyers and how to
412
regulate lawyers are not new, several of the cases on the Supreme
Court's 2009 docket shed a fresh light on this predicament. For
example, the Milavetz and Humanitarian Law Project cases both stem
from Congress's treatment of lawyers as gatekeepers and service
providers.413 Under the statutes at issue in each of these cases, lawyers
find themselves with new obligations to police, or at least deter, the
behavior of clients by denying them certain legal advice (and subject
to hefty penalties for failure to do so). Likewise, under these statutes
lawyers are regulated alongside non-lawyers who provide bankruptcy
or peace-making services without acknowledging the distinct and
important function of attorney advice and advocacy. 14
When lawyers are treated as gatekeepers or service providers, they
cease to serve solely as the advocate and advisor to the client, which
alters "not just the details of legal representation but its rationale and
function.4 1 5 As a result, "even when the new regulations appear to
leave intact the substance of previous rules balancing the interests of
410. Terry, supra note 407, at 189.
411. Id.
412. Indeed, as Professor David Wilkins wrote nearly twenty years ago in his
seminal article on the regulation of lawyers:
[d]uties to the legal framework require different kinds of maintenance
than obligations owed to clients. As a result, the question to be asked is not
who should regulate lawyers, but rather how should policymakers
coordinate the various resources at their disposal to increase the likelihood
that all segments of society can benefit from a competent and independent
legal profession.
David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lauyers ?, 105 HARv. L. REV. 799, 887 (1992).
413. See discussion supra notes 36-93 and accompanying text.
414. See e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 931 (9th Cir.
2009) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that "service" is an overbroad term for
regulating lawyers); see also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S.
Ct. 1324, 1329 (2010) (deciding that lawyers are appropriately categorized as debt
relief agencies whenever they provide qualifying services, and as such, are required to
make certain disclosures under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005).
415. Leubsdorf, supra note 409, at 960.
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clients and those of nonclients, they often impose more stringent
penalties that will sway lawyers to pay more attention to the latter.,
41 6
For these reasons, the ABA and state bar associations have argued
"that extensive gatekeeping [or service provider] duties cannot be
reconciled with the loyalty and confidentiality duties lawyers (unlike
[other professionals]) owe to their clients, and that 'deputizing'
lawyers as gatekeepers will discourage candid communication with
clients or client agents and ultimately be self-defeating.""41
The ten ineffective assistance of counsel cases approach the
question of who should regulate lawyers from another perspective. A
number of these cases expose how incredibly bad lawyering goes
unaddressed when the conduct at issue is not sufficiently damaging to
render it a constitutional violation. While professional conduct rules
exist to prevent the kinds of poor lawyering seen in the ineffective
assistance cases, it seems that enforcement of these rules through the
attorney discipline process is lacking in many ways.
These concerns are reflected in several of the Court's lawyering
cases from the 2009 term. The question that follows, then, is how
should the ABA and state bar organizations respond?
2. Appreciating the Role of the American Bar Association
Several lawyer ethics scholars predicted this expansion of external
regulation and proposed various ways the ABA and others might
adapt. Indeed, nearly a decade ago Professor William Hodes forecast
that "[u] nless the organized bar cleans its own house, sooner or later
government agencies will remove the unique measure of self-
regulation granted to the legal profession."4 1 8  Likewise, Professor
Fred Zacharias declared that, "[t]he ABA's purported goals of self-
regulation-fostering a complete regime of appropriate lawyer
behavior and forestalling external regulation-have proven
unrealistic. '419 Instead, he recommended that the ABA and state bar
organizations "attend to other functions that only they can
accomplish, 42° such as programs for assisting attorneys with substance
abuse.
By comparison, Professor Schneyer has offered a slightly more
optimistic future for the ABA's regulatory endeavors, suggesting:
416. Id.
417. Schneyer, supra note 404, at 583.
418. W. William Hodes, Truthfulness and Honesty Among American Lawyers:
Perception, Reality, and the Professional Reform Initiative, 53 S.C. L. REv. 527, 537 (2002).
419. Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147,
1189 (2009).
420. Id.
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[T] he bar can continue to have a substantial impact on the course
of lawyer regulation, if it recognizes that the channels through
which it does so will often be different than in the past. In the
emerging regime, bar influence will often have to be exerted by
negotiating with, testifying before, and submitting reports and
comments to "external" regulators, especially at the federal level.421
Similarly, Professor Terry has proposed that "it would be useful for
the ABA or others to develop a standard 'template' that could
be used when considering a new legal professional rule."4 2  She
recommends that the ABA articulate its regulating objectives, that it
conduct cross-cultural and cross-professional benchmarking, and that
• 1421
it be prepared to explain why special treatment is justified. She
believes such an approach would not only "lead to better regulations"
but that also "having thought through the justifications for its rules
ahead of time, the legal profession should be in a better position to
defend its rules if challenged" and the profession could more readily
"identify those rules that are most likely to be challenged and for
which it will need the strongest justifications."42 4 To be sure, the ABA
can do more.
The Supreme Court's handling of the ABA during cases from the
2009 term illustrates this point in striking ways that provide helpful
guidance to the ABA and state bar organizations for future regulatory
endeavors. For example, the Court paid an unusual amount of
attention to the role and influence of the ABA as the source of model
guidelines for the profession and as an advocate of practicing lawyers
in filing amicus curiae briefs.422 The Court's heightened focus on the
ABA offers at least two lessons.
First, in advocating its position as a representative of the legal
profession, the ABA needs to do its empirical homework. The ABA
421. Schneyer, supra note 404, at 609.
422. Terry, supra note 407, at 210.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. A number of Supreme Court commentators noted the unusual amount of
attention the ABA received from the Court during the 2009 term. See, e.g., Posting of
Marcia Coyle to The BLT: The Blog of Legal Times, http://legaltimes.typepad
.com/blt/2009/11/ajustices-curious-comment-about-aba-guidelines-for-death-
penalty-lawyers-.html (Nov. 10, 2009, 15:15 EST) (addressing the increased
discussion of ABA guidelines in recent Court opinions); Tony Mauro, High Court
Debates Value of Attorney-Client Privilege, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 6, 2009, http://www.law.com/
jsp/article.jsp?id=1202434312108 (discussing Justices' skepticism regarding the
protections due to the attorney-client privilege); Debra Cassens Weiss, ABA Gets
'Shout Out' in Oral Arguments About Attorney-Client Privilege, ABAJouRNAL, Oct. 6, 2009,
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/abagets shout out inoralarguments a
bout.attorney-client.privilege/ (noting the Court's discussion and division of
opinion in regards to the importance of ABA guidelines).
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should conduct fact-based, empirical studies to explain the unique
role of attorneys and to support the position it advances, especially
when necessary to justify treating lawyers differently from other
professionals. For example, during the oral argument for Mohawk
Industries, Chief Justice Roberts commented on the ABA's position in
its amicus curiae brief "that the opening up of the privilege and the
disclosure, however rare the case is, will, in fact, undermine the-the
value of the privilege."4 26 He explained that "[the Court] -I, at least,
look at a brief from the American Bar Association and view that as a
representation of how the people affected here, the lawyers, view the
value of the privilege and what will happen to it.
427
In the end, however, the Court disagreed with the ABA's position
in Mohawk, reasoning that "in deciding how freely to speak, clients
and counsel are unlikely to focus on the remote prospect of an
erroneous disclosure order, let alone the timing of a possible
appeal."428 Yet in a footnote the Court further observed that this
conclusion "[p]erhaps... would be different if district courts were
systematically underenforcing the privilege." 42 9 Had the ABA offered
a study evidencing under-enforcement of the privilege or other
empirical findings to support treating attorney-client privilege
differently than other protected material like trade secrets, the result
might have been different. At a minimum, the Court appears open
to considering such information in future cases. Empirical research
might also assist in facilitating improvements for state attorney
discipline systems.
Second, another common thread running among nearly all of the
cases discussed in this Article is reliance by at least one party on the
ABA Model Rules as a measure for the reasonable actions of
lawyers.43°  In this way, the cases demonstrate the role that
professional conduct rules play outside the lawyer discipline process,
a function often underappreciated by those outside the law of
426. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 387, at 38.
427. Id. at 38-39. But see Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1488 (2010) (Alito,
J., concurring) ("And we must recognize that such standards may represent only the
aspirations of a bar group rather than an empirical assessment of actual practice.").
428. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 607 (2009).
429. Id. at 607 n.2.
430. See, e.g., Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 5, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651) (citing relevant ABA Model
Rules and ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function and Defense
Function); Brief for Petitioners at 44-45, 71-72, Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., v.
United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010) (No. 08-1119) (citing ABA Model Rules 1.1, 1.3,
1.4, 2.1, 7.1, and 8.4 to argue against categorizing an attorney as a debt relief
agency); Respondent's Brief, supra note 123, at 59 (referencing ABA Model Rule 1.15
in support of an argument permitting attorneys to receive fees from client windfalls).
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lawyering field. Not only did the parties cite ABA rules and
guidelines, but the Court also explicitly relied upon them as a
measure of what should be expected from a reasonable lawyer. For
example, in Milavetz, the Court cited Model Rule 1.2(d), which
prohibits an attorney from endorsing or participating in a client's
crime or fraud, but at the same time allows an attorney to advise a
client, when appropriate, about legal strategies for testing or
challenging a law.431 In justifying a narrowed construction of the
bankruptcy advice ban, the Court referred to requirements of Model
Rule 1.2(d), implicitly suggesting that the federal statute not be
construed to conflict with the Model Rule.432 And in the cases of
Padilla v. Kentucky and Bobby v. Van Hook, the Court offered further
insight about how it views the role of professional conduct rules in
constitutional analysis.433
While the Supreme Court has been reluctant to
"constitutionalize4 34 standards of professional conduct, it has looked
to the ABA Model Rules when evaluating attorney behavior in some
circumstances, with a particular reliance on the Model Rules when
evaluating the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to
effective assistance of counsel.435 For example, in Padilla v. Kentucky,
Justice Stevens wrote:
We long have recognized that prevailing norms of practice as
reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like...
are guides to determining what is reasonable .... Although they
are only guides, and not inexorable commands, these standards
may be valuable measures of the prevailing professional norms of
436
effective representation ....
431. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2009) ("A lawyer shall not
counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any
proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a
good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the
law.").
432. See Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1337-38 (rejecting the suggestion that the
bankruptcy advice ban generally disallows debt relief agencies from discussing other
subjects, and noting that "[c]overed professionals remain free to talk fully and
candidly about the incurrence of debt in contemplation of filing a bankruptcy case")
(citation and internal punctuation omitted).
433. See supra notes 270-87, 315-46 and accompanying text.
434. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986) (looking to the Model Rules for
guidance but cautioning that "[w]hen examining attorney conduct, a court must be
careful not to narrow the wide range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth
Amendment so restrictively as to consitutionalize particular standards of professional
conduct").
435. Id. (discussing the relationship between professional standards and the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel).
436. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (citations and internal punctuation omitted).
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And the Court relied upon these standards along with those
promulgated by other legal organizations to hold that the
Constitution requires a lawyer to advise the client whether a plea
carries a deportation risk.43v  Specifically, the Court looked to
"[a] uthorities of every stripe-including the American Bar
Association, criminal defense and public defender organizations,
authoritative treatises, and state and city bar publications-universally
require defense attorneys to advise as to the risk of deportation
consequences for non-citizen clients."
43
The Court adopted a different position, however, in Bobby v. Van
Hook, though perhaps more due to the fact that the ABA guidelines at
issue were outdated rather than reflecting a movement away from the
use of such benchmarks for evaluating the duties and obligations of a
reasonable attorney. 9 The Court took issue with the Sixth Circuit's
reliance on a version of the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (Guidelines)
"announced 18 years after Van Hook went to trial"'0 and faulted "the
[circuit court for] treat [ing] the ABA's 2003 Guidelines not merely as
evidence of what reasonably diligent attorneys would do, but as
inexorable commands with which all capital defense counsel must
fully comply. ' 44' The Court held that "Uj]udging counsel's conduct in
the 1980's on the basis of these 2003 Guidelines-without even
pausing to consider whether they reflected the prevailing
professional practice at the time of the trial-was error."442 The Court
further cautioned that "'American Bar Association standards and the
like' are 'only guides' to what reasonableness means, not its
definition." 3  Accordingly, the Court declared that "[w]hile states
[and private organizations] are free to impose whatever specific rules
they see fit to ensure that criminal defendants are well represented,
437. See id. at 1483.
438. Id. at 1482 (citations and internal punctuation omitted).
439. See 130 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2009) (per curiam) ("Restatements of professional
standards, we have recognized, can be useful as 'guides' to what reasonableness
entails, but only to the extent they describe the professional norms prevailing when
the representation took place.") (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688
(1984)).
440. Id. The Guidelines in effect when Van Hook committed the murder
"described defense counsel's duty to investigate both the merits and mitigating
circumstances in general terms" whereas the Guidelines applied by the Sixth Circuit
"discuss[ed] the duty to investigate mitigating evidence in exhaustive detail,
specifying what attorneys should look for, where to look, and when to begin."
Id. at 17.
441. Id. at 17 (citation and internal punctuation omitted).
442. Id.
443. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
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we have held that the Federal Constitution imposes one general
requirement: that counsel make objectively reasonable choices., 44
Thus it seems, going forward, the Court is likely to continue using
ABA standards as guides for reasonable attorney behavior so long as
the standard applied was in place at the time of the behavior in
question, but the ABA should not simply assume this. Concurring in
Padilla v. Kentucky, Justice Alito criticized the majority by writing:
The Court tries to justify its dramatic departure from precedent by
pointing to the views of various professional organizations....
However, ascertaining the level of professional competence
required by the Sixth Amendment is ultimately a task for the
courts. Although we may appropriately consult standards
promulgated by private bar groups, we cannot delegate to these
groups our task of determining what the Constitution commands.
And we must recognize that such standards may represent only the
aspirations of a bar group rather than an empirical assessment of
445
actual practice.
Likewise, Justice Alito wrote a separate concurrence in Bobby v. Van
Hook to "emphasize [his] understanding that the opinion in no way
suggests that the [Guidelines] have special relevance in determining
whether an attorney's performance meets the standard required
by the Sixth Amendment. " 446 In his mind, while "[t]he ABA is a
venerable organization with a history of service to the bar.... it is,
after all, a private group with limited membership.... [Its] views...
do not necessarily reflect the views of the American bar as a whole. '47
Justice Alito would place the responsibility "to determine the nature
of the work that a defense attorney must do in a capital case in order
to meet the obligations imposed by the Constitution" with the courts,
not the ABA.4" Though his views were not shared by the majority, the
fact that Justice Alito felt compelled to issue a separate concurrence
to the otherwise unanimous per curiam opinion suggests that the
debate about the ABA's role in this regard is ongoing among the
members of the Supreme Court."8 A lesson for the ABA is to ensure
that in holding itself out as a representative of the legal profession
444. Id. (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479 (2000)) (internal
punctuation omitted).
445. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1488 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring in
judgment).
446. Bobby, 130 S. Ct. at 20 (Alito,J., concurring).
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. The debate also was evident in Chief Justice Robert's self-correction from
"we" to "I" when expressing his view on the role of the ABA as a representative of
the legal profession during the Mohawk oral argument. See supra note 427 and
accompanying text.
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as a whole, it actually constitutes an accurate representation. The
ABA can no longer simply rest its case on the history of exclusive state
court regulation.
C. Expanding Focus on the Constitutional Aspects of the Law of Lawyering
Finally, if any question remains as to the importance of
constitutional considerations in the study and scholarship of lawyer
ethics, the Court's newest lawyering precedent should end that
debate. Professor Monroe Freedman, credited with establishing
modem legal ethics as a serious academic specialty, 450 has observed
that scholars all too often give inadequate attention to the
constitutional aspects of the field.45' Yet, the overwhelming
majority of the lawyering cases that sparked the Court's interest
during the 2009 term involved constitutional challenges.452 Milavetz
and Humanitarian Law Project questioned whether the First
Amendment applies to attorney advice and advocacy. The ten
ineffective assistance of counsel cases forced the Court to revisit the
constitutional rights and safeguards guaranteed to a defendant in a
criminal trial. This developing area of Supreme Court jurisprudence
offers a bounty of material for teaching lawyer ethics and for
continuing to build upon the academic scholarship addressing the
constitutional issues of lawyer ethics that Professor Freedman and
others have begun. 53
450. See generally Ronald Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, Appearance of Impropriety, and the
Proposed New ABA Judicial Code, 34 HorsTRA L. REv. 1337, 1337 (2006) (attributing the
development of legal ethics as an academic area of concentration to Professor
Monroe Freedman).
451. Professor Monroe Freedman made this observation in his comments as a
panelist at the Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting Hot Topic
Panel. See Monroe Freedman, Professor, Hofstra Univ. Sch. of Law, Ass'n of
American Law Sch. Annual Meeting Hot Topic Panel: The U.S. Supreme Court's
Increased Attention to the Law of Lawyering: Mere Coincidence or Something
More? (Jan. 7, 2010), available at http://memberaccess.aals.org/eWeb/
DynamicPage.aspx?Site=AALS&WebKey=b8e081a5-3clb-41 ca-8clf-c9d84b62a02f&
RegPath=EventRegFees&REgevt-key=e95fe6b3-00bd-4570-950c-dl bfaO9e5lOc).
452. See discussion infra notes 434, 435.
453. For just a small sample of the existing scholarship on intersections between
the law of lawyering and constitutional issues, see Fred Zacharias, Rethinking
Confidentiality II: Is Confidentiality Constitutional?, 75 IOwA L. REv. 601 (1990); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Silence is not Golden: Protecting Lawyer Speech Under the First Amendment,
47 EMoRY L.J. 859 (1998); W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 305 (2001); Monroe Freedman & Abbe Smith, UNDERSTANDING LANNTERS'
ETHICS, §§ 4.07-4.09, 12.06-12.12 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2004); Margaret
Tarkington, The Truth Be Damned: The First Amendment, Attorney Speech, and Judicial
Reputation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1567 (2009); Erica Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The
Criminal Defendant 's Right to Control the Case, 90 B.U. L. REv. 1147 (2010).
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CONCLUSION
In response to the question posed at the outset, this Article
concludes that the Supreme Court's increased interest in the law of
lawyering is more than mere coincidence. Each case addressed
during the 2009 term encompassed issues fundamental to the role of
an attorney and the rights of a client: access to legal advice,
effectiveness of counsel, attorney-client privilege protections, and fee
awards. Moreover, when considered together, the cases evidence
increased attention to concerns about access to the legal system and
effective lawyers, especially concerns involving constitutional issues.
Those involved in future regulation of the profession should pay
careful attention to the lessons offered by these cases, as should
practitioners and scholars in the law of lawyering field.
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APPENDIX
Set forth below is a list of cases involving lawyering issues over the
past decade, collected as described supra notes 14 to 22 and
accompanying text.
1999 TERM
* Portunodo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 63 (2000) (prosecutorial
misconduct, comments during closing argument)
" Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 473 (2000) (ineffective
assistance of counsel, failure to file notice of appeal)
" Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 264-65 (2000) (ineffective
assistance of counsel, failure to file merits brief on appeal)
-Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398-99 (2000) (ineffective
assistance of counsel, sufficiency of mitigation evidence)
2000 TERM
* Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 600
(2001) (attorneys' fees under fee shifting statute)
* Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 536 (2001) (First
Amendment challenge to funding and legal advocacy restrictions
under the Legal Services Corporation Act)
2001 TERM
* Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 688, 692 (2002) (ineffective assistance
of counsel, sufficiency of mitigation evidence and waiver of
closing argument)
* Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 792-93 (2002) (attorneys'
fees for representing Social Security benefits claimants)
" Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 164 (2002) (ineffective assistance
of counsel, conflict of interest)
* United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002) (prosecutorial
misconduct, disclosures required before plea agreement)
2002 TERM
- Brown v. Legal Foundation, 538 U.S. 216, 220 (2003) (lawyers'
trust accounts)
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• Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 514 (2003) (ineffective assistance
of counsel, sufficiency of mitigation evidence)
* Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5, 11 (2003) (per curiam)
(ineffective assistance of counsel, prejudicial closing argument)
2003 TERM
" Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 675 (2004) (prosecutorial
misconduct, disclosure of potentially exculpatory or impeaching
evidence)
" Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 178 (2004) (ineffective assistance
of counsel, concession of guilt without defendant's express
consent)
* Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 529 (2004)
(attorneys' fees in bankruptcy proceedings)
" Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 13 (2003) (per curiam)
(ineffective assistance of counsel, failure to raise argument about
state's non-compliance with sentencing procedures)
" Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 405-06 (2004) (attorneys'
fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act)
2004 Term
" Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 187-88 (2005) (prosecutorial
misconduct, use of inconsistent theories to secure convictions of
two defendants for same crime)
" Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 134, 139-40 (2005)
(attorneys' fees when remanding a case to state court after
removal to federal court)
" Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377 (2005) (ineffective assistance
of counsel, sufficiency of mitigation evidence)
2006 TERM
" Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 (2007) (ineffective
assistance of counsel, miscalculation of statute of limitations
period)
• Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 468 (2007) (ineffective
assistance of counsel, sufficiency of mitigation evidence)
* Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 77-78 (2007) (attorneys' fees,
prevailing party requirement under fee-shifting statute)
* Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pacific Gas, 549 U.S. 443, 445 (2007)
(attorneys' fees under federal bankruptcy law)
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2007 TERM
- Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 121 (2008) (per curiam)
(ineffective assistance of counsel, attorney participation in plea
hearing by speaker phone)
2008 TERM
" Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1772-73 (2009) (prosecutorial
misconduct, disclosure of mitigating evidence)
* Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1414 (2009) (ineffective
assistance of counsel, withdrawal of insanity defense)
" Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 858 (2009)
(prosecutorial misconduct, disclosure of impeaching evidence)
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